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I.

INTRODUCTION
1

Whether a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top,” the
competition among many states to encourage businesses to
incorporate in their states has wide-ranging consequences for those
businesses. Those consequences include the allocation of rights,
powers, duties, and liabilities among corporate directors, officers,
and shareholders.
Despite the tendency to analyze this
2
competition as a multi-state contest, empirical research shows that
the “race” is actually a vast number of individual races between just
1. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in
Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1777-78 (2002) (summarizing both sides of
that debate).
2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal
Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961, 961 (2001) (“The choice [of where
to incorporate] available to corporations . . . has generated competition among
states for incorporations.”).
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two states at a time: the state in which the would-be corporation’s
3
principal office will be located and Delaware.
Attorneys and their clients are regularly faced with the
decision of where to incorporate a new business or whether to
reincorporate in another state.
If the decision involves a
Minnesota-based business, one commentator has suggested that the
only rational choice for a multi-shareholder corporation is to avoid
4
incorporating in Minnesota, thereby suggesting that Delaware
should be the winner by default. The authors believe that is the
5
wrong conclusion.
The analysis in this Article focuses on comparing Delaware
corporate law and jurisprudence primarily to one jurisdiction,
Minnesota, where the authors reside. The bipartite nature of this
comparative focus serves to crystallize significant differences. The
utility of the analysis is broader, however. To the extent that the
Article concludes that Minnesota provides more favorable or
rational corporate treatment than Delaware, this comparison is
relevant to corporations based in many other states since a
substantial portion of the Minnesota statute is modeled on the
Model Business Corporation Act and laws of other states.
Moreover, to the extent that the analysis in this Article is critical of
Delaware statutory or judicial law standing on its own, the criticism
applies in favor of every other state that does not have the
particular Delaware statutory provision or judicial decision or
construct.
A recent example, however, illustrates the usefulness of an
initial analysis comparing only two states, Delaware and Minnesota.
On August 1, 2004, the Constitution of the State of Delaware and
the Delaware corporate statute were each amended to permit
capital stock to be issued to shareholders for virtually any form of
consideration, including any tangible or intangible property or any
6
benefit to the corporation. As a result, Delaware corporations may
3. Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46
J.L. & ECON. 383, 396-402 (2003).
4. Bryn Vaaler, Scrap the Minnesota Business Corporation Act!, 28 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 1365, 1368-72 (2002).
5. Market data appear to support the authors’ conclusion. As of 1999,
approximately 75% of the publicly held, non-financial corporations located in
Minnesota had chosen Minnesota as their state of incorporation. Bebchuk &
Cohen, supra note 3, at 395.
6. DEL. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (repealed by 74 Del. Laws ch. 281 (2004)); see
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now, for the first time, issue stock payable in whole or in part by a
promissory note or, most likely, a promise to render future
7
services. The amendment was hailed as an important change to
Delaware law designed to increase Delaware corporations’
flexibility with respect to stock issuances. Interestingly, however,
the new Delaware statutory provision is nearly identical in
substance to a statutory provision that has provided flexibility to
Minnesota corporations in the key area of stock issuances for over
8
twenty years. That revelation is the genesis of this Article.
The utility and desirability of the Minnesota Business
9
Corporation Act (“MBCA”) are subjects of widely divergent
10
opinions. The authors of Minnesota Corporation Law and Practice,
who are co-authors of this Article, state that the MBCA “continues
to be one of the most flexible, state-of-the-art corporation statutes
11
in the nation.” A lawyer at one of Minnesota’s leading law firms
takes a contrary view, alleging that “Minnesota has become a poor
choice for incorporation in nearly all cases beyond that of a oneperson, one-shareholder incorporated proprietorship. . . . Today
. . . the best advice Minnesota lawyers can give their clients, whether
their businesses are to be closely or publicly held, is to avoid
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152 (2001 & Supp. 2004) (setting forth permissible forms
of consideration for stock).
7. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 152. The Delaware statute previously permitted
the use of a promissory note to pay the portion of the purchase price of the stock
that did not constitute capital. Id. (prior to amendment by 74 Del. Laws ch. 326
(2004)). Unlike the Minnesota statute, section 152 of the Delaware statute does
not expressly authorize the issuance of stock for future services, but such
consideration probably would be deemed to constitute a statutory “benefit to the
corporation.”
8. MINN. STAT. § 302A.405, subd. 1(a) (2004).
9. Id. ch. 302A. The MBCA was enacted in 1981. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
302A.001 at 181 (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes and Report to the Senate,
Preface). Development of the MBCA was spearheaded by an advisory task force
formed in May 1979 at the initiative of the Minnesota Senate, the Minnesota
Secretary of State, and the Corporation, Banking, and Business Law Section (now
the Business Law Section) of the Minnesota State Bar Association. Id. A primary
objective of the task force was to provide a flexible, comprehensive corporate
statute that could be adapted by each corporation through its charter documents
and shareholder agreements to accommodate the particular characteristics and
needs of the corporation and its shareholders. Id. at 184-85 (Background). The
statute codifies substantially more corporate law than did its predecessor. Id. at
187 (Highlights of the Proposal).
10. 18-19 JOHN H. MATHESON & PHILIP S. GARON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES:
MINNESOTA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2004).
11. 18 id. § 1.1, at 3.
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12

incorporating in Minnesota.”
Such a divergence of views demands a more detailed analysis
of the MBCA and its Delaware counterpart and a comparison of
13
Minnesota corporate law to Delaware corporate law. The results
of that analysis, as set forth in this Article, are as follows:
(1) The MBCA is preferable to the Delaware corporate
statute in several areas of corporate law from the standpoint of key
14
corporate constituencies.
(2) The Delaware corporate statute is preferable in certain
other respects to the MBCA from the standpoint of those
15
constituencies.
(3) Several of the statutory differences touted as reasons to
16
incorporate in Delaware simply do not favor Delaware.
(4) Perhaps most importantly, the MBCA codifies
17
substantially more corporate law than does the Delaware statute.
The extensive body of corporate case law in Delaware that many
find laudable is necessitated by gaps in the Delaware statute. Even
though the Delaware case law is extensive, Minnesota’s statutory
codification creates more certainty than the Delaware case law
because of (a) internal ambiguities in many of the Delaware
judicial decisions; (b) apparent inconsistencies among certain
contemporaneously decided Delaware cases; (c) divergence of
certain decisions with the letter of, and apparent policy behind, the
Delaware statute; and (d) tendency of the Delaware courts to
18
reverse or ignore precedent and upset expectations.
II. ADVANTAGES OF THE MBCA VERSUS DELAWARE
A. Incorporation and Annual Fees
Minnesota charges a fixed incorporation fee of $135,
regardless of the corporation’s size or the number of its authorized
12. Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1368, 1371.
13. See generally William F. Archerd & Timothy J. Scallen, A Comparison of
Minnesota and Delaware Business Corporation Statutes, 14 HAMLINE L. REV. 151 (1990)
(reviewing the Minnesota and Delaware corporate statutory differences).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
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19

shares, and no annual fees are imposed by the State of Minnesota
20
upon Minnesota corporations. Delaware, in contrast, imposes an
initial incorporation fee based upon the monetary value of the
21
corporation’s par-value stock.
For example, a company with
authorized capital stock having an aggregate par value of $10
million would pay an initial incorporation fee of $1,200. If the
stock has no par value, Delaware charges a fee based on the
22
number of authorized shares of the corporation.
The more onerous fee for a Delaware corporation is the
annual franchise fee, which, subject to possible reduction under an
alternative computation, is based upon the number of authorized
23
shares.
A corporation with ten million authorized shares, for
example, must pay an annual franchise tax of $62,550, or such
24
lower amount calculated under Delaware’s alternative formula.
19. MINN. STAT. § 302A.153 (2004).
20. Although Minnesota Statutes section 302A.821 requires Minnesota
corporations to file an annual registration with the secretary of state, no fee is
required to be paid with that registration. Id. § 302A.821(b), subd. 1; see also
Minnesota Secretary of State, Domestic Corporation Annual Renewal Form,
http://www.sos.state.mn.us/business/pdf/06920908.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
21. Delaware’s initial incorporation fee on par-value stock is $.02 per $100 of
par value up to $2 million of par value, $.01 for each additional $100 of par value
up to $20 million of total par value, and $.004 for each additional $100 of par
value. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 391(a)(1) (2001).
22. The fee for no-par-value stock is $.01 per share up to 20,000 shares, $.005
per share thereafter up to two million shares, and $.004 per share thereafter. Id.
The minimum incorporation fee, regardless of whether the corporation’s stock
has par value, is $15.00. Id.
23. The annual fee is $35 for 3000 shares or less, $62.50 for up to 5000 shares,
$112.50 for up to 10,000 shares, and $62.50 for each additional 10,000 shares or
fraction thereof. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 503(a) (2001 & Supp. 2004).
24. The Department of State for the State of Delaware provides a Franchise
Tax Calculator to assist persons interested in calculating the franchise tax for their
companies using either the “Authorized Share Method” described above or the
alternative “Assumed Par Value Method” (“APVM”). See Delaware Department of
State, Division of Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/corp/taxcalc.shtml (last
visited Jan. 4, 2006). The APVM, which applies only to a corporation with parvalue stock of less than $100 per share, is calculated by dividing the total gross
assets of the company by the number of issued shares, multiplying the quotient or,
if greater, the par value of the shares, by the number of authorized shares, and
imposing the fee at $250 per $1 million or fraction of $1 million of that product.
If the product is less than $1 million, the fee is determined on a consolidated basis
by taking the quotient of the product divided by $1 million, and then multiplying
the result by $250 (subject to the minimum fee of $35). The company’s total gross
assets are determined by the company’s U.S. Form 1120, Schedule L, for the fiscal
year ending the calendar year of the report. Using this method, if the company
described above with 10 million shares of stock had five million issued shares and

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/6

6

Garon et al.: Challenging Delaware's Desirability as a Haven for Incorporation
09GARONSTANCHFIELDMATHESON.DOC

2006]

1/14/2006 5:57:31 PM

CHALLENGING DELAWARE’S DESIRABILITY

775

25

The maximum annual franchise fee is $165,000. The Delaware
franchise fees are a significant ongoing financial burden to
Delaware corporations. As a result, each corporation must assess
whether the benefits of being a Delaware corporation justify such
significant additional fees.
B. Dividends and Stock Repurchases
The additional Delaware franchise fees certainly are not
justified by the differences in the permissibility of dividends and
stock repurchases under the laws of the two states. Since its
adoption, the MBCA has provided that, unless a Minnesota
corporation has outstanding preferred stock, dividends on
common stock and repurchases of common stock by the
corporation may be made if, after giving effect to the distribution,
26
the corporation can pay its debts as they become due.
This
provision represented a substantial departure from the statutes of
most states, which permitted dividends to be paid only out of net
assets of the corporation, subject to certain exceptions and
27
additional limitations.
The Delaware statute permits dividends to be paid only out of
a corporation’s surplus or from its net profits either for the current
28
year or the preceding year and stock to be repurchased only when
$1 million in assets (and a per-share par value of $.20 or less), the franchise fee
would be $500 instead of $62,550. If the company had $250 million in assets, the
franchise tax would be $125,000 if calculated using APVM. Since such amount
exceeds the fee calculated using the Authorized Share Method ($62,550), the fee
would be calculated using the Authorized Share Method.
25. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 503(c).
26. MINN. STAT. § 302A.551, subd. 1 (2004). If a corporation has one or more
classes or series of outstanding preferred stock that have preferential rights to
distributions, then the corporation may make the distribution with respect to
common stock only if (1) all amounts payable to the holders of the preferred stock
having a preference for payment of that kind of distribution are paid and (2) the
payment of the distribution does not reduce the corporation’s remaining net
assets below the aggregate preferential amount payable to such holders upon
liquidation of the corporation. Id. § 302A.551, subd. 4(a).
27. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes, 1981,
Change From Former Law). For a general discussion of the effect of the
Reporter’s Notes on the interpretation of MBCA provisions, see 18 MATHESON &
GARON, supra note 10, § 1.2. A number of other states have since abandoned the
“net assets” test for permissible distributions to shareholders. MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT ANN. § 6.40 cmt. nn. 2-5 (2002) (discussing statutory comparison).
28. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a) (2001). “Surplus” is defined to be the
excess of the net assets over the capital of the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
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29

the repurchase would not impair the corporation’s capital. The
capital of the shares with par value is the aggregate par value of the
issued shares (or such higher amount as the board may have
30
determined).
Statutory restrictions on dividends are generally designed to
increase the likelihood that creditors will be paid before
shareholders in the event that insufficient funds are available to pay
31
both. Basing these restrictions on net assets or current net profits
is artificial because assets may be illiquid and because a company at
a particular point in time may have sufficient net assets (or surplus)
or current net profits to pay a dividend even though it could not
pay its creditors as its debts or other obligations mature. The
MBCA’s approach, allowing dividends based upon whether the
corporation can pay its debts as they become due, accounts for
these shortfalls and conforms “with the reality of the world of
32
modern corporate finance.”
Despite the recognition by the
Minnesota legislature in 1981 that surplus tests do not adequately
address the public-policy objectives underlying statutes restricting
dividends and stock repurchases, the Delaware statute remains
unchanged today.

154 (2001 & Supp. 2004).
29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a) (2001).
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 154 (2001 & Supp. 2004). The capital of shares
without par value is the total consideration paid for those shares, subject to the
right of the board to classify as capital a lesser amount of the consideration for
shares without par value at the time of the issuance of shares for cash or within
sixty days after the issuance of stock for non-cash consideration. Id.
31. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 14.3 (1986).
32. The Reporter’s Notes to Minnesota Statute § 302A.551 appropriately
state:
The main purpose of this section is to bring the statute into conformity
with the reality of the world of modern corporate finance. As the Model
Act comment states: It has long been recognized by practitioners and
legal scholars that the pervasive statutory structure in which ‘par value’
and ‘stated capital’ are basic to the state corporation statutes does not
today serve the original purpose of protecting creditors and senior
security holders from payments to junior security holders, and may, to
the extent security holders are led to believe that it provides some
protection, tend to be misleading.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes, 1981, General
Comment) (quoting Committee on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association,
Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act—Amendments to Financial Provisions, 34
BUS. LAW. 1867, 1867 (1979)).
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C. Flexibility for Board Actions
The flexibility of the MBCA with respect to permissible board
actions certainly favors incorporation in Minnesota. A Minnesota
corporation may provide in its articles of incorporation that its
board of directors can take action by written consent of the same
number of directors who could take action at a meeting at which all
directors are present (generally a majority of the board) unless the
33
action also requires shareholder approval.
The MBCA permits
such an action only if the corporation has determined, by so
34
providing in its articles, that such added flexibility is advisable.
The Delaware statute, on the other hand, does not provide that
35
Boards of Delaware
flexibility to Delaware corporations.
corporations cannot take action by less than unanimous written
consent of their directors, regardless of whether corporate
36
stakeholders desire to grant that authority.
Additional flexibility also is given under the MBCA to directors
who are unable to attend a board meeting. If so provided in the
corporation’s articles of incorporation or bylaws, absent directors
may give advance written consent or opposition to a proposal to be
37
acted on at the meeting (effectively an “absentee ballot”). The
advance consent or opposition is counted as a vote at the meeting if
the proposal at the meeting is substantially the same or has
substantially the same effect as the proposal to which the absent
38
director consented or objected. The Delaware statute does not
provide this flexibility.

33. MINN. STAT. § 302A.239, subd. 1 (2004).
34. From a policy standpoint, the wisdom of permitting written consent by
less than all directors is debatable. Proponents argue that permitting action by
less than unanimous written consent provides more flexibility to a board,
particularly when action needs to be taken under tight time constraints.
Opponents claim that permitting board action by less than unanimous written
consent deprives dissenting directors of the opportunity to convince other
directors at a board meeting to change their position. The MBCA, however, does
not dictate that a board be permitted to take action by less than unanimous
written consent. It affords the opportunity to the corporation to decide in its
articles of incorporation the wisdom of permitting such actions by less than
unanimous consent.
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(f) (2001).
36. Id.
37. MINN. STAT. § 302A.233.
38. Id. The absentee ballot may not be counted for quorum purposes,
however. Id.
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D. Short-Form Mergers
The MBCA also provides more flexibility than the Delaware
statute with respect to short-form mergers. State corporate statutes
generally include short-form merger provisions, which are designed
to avoid the expense and delay associated with requiring
shareholders of 90%-or-greater subsidiaries to vote to approve
mergers with their parent corporations or, under certain statutes,
39
with other affiliates of the parent corporation.
The statutes
recognize that the expense and delay is unnecessary in this context
40
because the result of the vote is a foregone conclusion.
The Delaware short-form merger statute is limited in scope,
covering mergers between a parent corporation and one or more
direct subsidiaries of which at least 90% of the outstanding shares
of each class that would be entitled to vote on the merger in the
41
absence of the short-form merger statute are owned by the parent.
The merger can be a merger either of one or more of the
subsidiaries into the parent or a merger of the parent (or of the
parent and one or more of the direct subsidiaries) into one of the
42
direct subsidiaries. The MBCA, in contrast, is more flexible in
that it permits mergers of direct or indirect subsidiaries with the
parent corporation under its short-form merger provisions, so long
as at least 90% of each class and series of the subsidiaries that
would be entitled to vote on the merger in the absence of the shortform merger statute is directly or indirectly owned by the parent
43
corporation.
The MBCA also permits use of the short-form
merger statute to merge a 90% directly or indirectly owned
subsidiary into another similarly owned subsidiary—thereby
avoiding a shareholder vote of minority shareholders of those
44
subsidiaries.

39. JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS § 22.12 (2d ed. 2003).
40. Id.
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (2001 & Supp. 2004).
42. Id.
43. MINN. STAT. § 302A.621, subd. 1 (2004).
44. Id. However, the default rule under the Delaware statute providing that
shareholders may take action by less than unanimous written consent, section 228
of the Delaware statute, alleviates to some extent the narrower application of the
short-form merger provisions. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (2001).
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E. Board Committees
The MBCA also provides substantial flexibility to a board of
directors to establish and delegate authority to board committees.
Each committee formed may consist of directors and non-directors
45
or solely of non-directors. As noted in the Reporter’s Notes to the
MBCA, “[t]his provision permits the corporation to make full use
of the talents of non-directors with special expertise, or of directors
46
or officers of related or non-related corporations.” Moreover, the
authority that can be delegated to a committee is not
circumscribed by the MBCA—each committee of a Minnesota
corporation may have such authority as may be prescribed by the
47
board of directors.
A Delaware board committee, in contrast, must consist solely
48
of directors.
Changes to the Delaware statute have eliminated
nearly all restrictions on the ability of boards of directors to grant
49
authority to committees. Nevertheless, committees of Delaware
corporations cannot be delegated the power of the board to take
actions (such as approval of mergers or sales of substantially all
assets) that by statute cannot be finally approved without
shareholder action or to adopt or amend bylaws that the board has
50
the power to adopt or amend.
F.

Statutory Share Exchanges

Even in the area of business combinations, the MBCA offers
increased flexibility. Both the MBCA and the Delaware statute
authorize merger transactions by which the board of directors and
shareholders holding a majority of the outstanding shares can vote
to approve a business combination that eliminates all shareholders
as shareholders of the merged corporation, regardless of whether
51
the minority shareholders approve the transaction. The MBCA

45. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subd. 2.
46. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.241 (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes, 1981,
General Comment).
47. MINN. STAT. § 302A.241, subd. 1.
48. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (2001 & Supp. 2004).
49. Compare id. § 141(c)(1), with id. § 141(c)(2). The broader statutory
authority does not apply to corporations incorporated before July 1, 1996 that
have not elected to be governed by the new provisions. Id. § 141(c)(1).
50. Id. § 141(c)(2).
51. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251-252 (2001); MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.601, subd.
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also authorizes an alternative type of business combination—the
statutory share exchange—whereby the board of directors and
shareholders of a Minnesota corporation can approve the
exchange by all shareholders (even those who do not approve the
exchange) of all of their shares of stock (or all of the shares of a
particular class or series) of the acquired corporation for stock of
52
the acquiring corporation or other consideration. The acquired
corporation in a statutory share exchange generally becomes a
wholly owned subsidiary of the acquiring corporation. The end
53
result is usually the same as in a “reverse triangular” merger.
An acquiring corporation organized in Canada or certain
other countries may prefer a statutory share exchange to a merger
under the tax or other laws of its jurisdiction of incorporation.
While the MBCA facilitates that preference, the Delaware statute
does not permit such statutory share exchanges.
In sum, the MBCA offers a backdrop of low taxation and a
high degree of flexibility for corporate stakeholders to mold the
statutory provisions to their unique needs. An objective analysis of
the statute, however, also requires discussion of possible
shortcomings of the MBCA—whether real or imagined.
III. POSSIBLE DISADVANTAGES OF THE MBCA VERSUS DELAWARE
Certain aspects of the MBCA, and of state statutes with
provisions comparable to those in the MBCA, have occasionally
54
been criticized; those criticisms are discussed in this section. To
the extent they are justified, the criticisms should be viewed in the
context of the greater flexibility and decreased fees described
above that are available to Minnesota corporations. Moreover, an
1, 302A.615, 302A.651.
52. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.601, subd. 2, 302A.615.
53. In a reverse triangular merger, the acquiring corporation creates a wholly
owned shell subsidiary that merges into the acquired corporation, with the
acquired corporation surviving the merger. The plan of merger provides that all
shares of the acquired corporation become owned by the acquiring corporation
and that former shareholders of the acquired corporation receive cash, shares of
the acquiring corporation, or other property from the acquiring corporation. See
generally 1 LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF
COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 1.03[5] (2005) (describing and depicting
a reverse triangular merger).
54. See, e.g., Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1371. In Scrap the Minnesota Business
Corporation Act!, Vaaler focuses on several provisions of the MBCA that he alleges
make “the MBCA such a bad corporation statute.” Id.
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analysis of each of the allegedly disadvantageous statutory
provisions of the MBCA leads the authors to conclude that most are
well-crafted provisions that achieve a reasonable balance among
director, officer, and shareholder rights and appropriately reflect
shareholder expectations, with one notable exception.
A. Calling Meetings of Shareholders
Under the MBCA, a special meeting of shareholders may be
55
called by any of the following:
[t]he chief executive officer; [t]he chief financial officer;
[t]wo or more directors; . . . or [a] shareholder or
shareholders holding ten percent or more of the voting
power of all shares entitled to vote, except that a special
meeting for the purpose of considering any action to
directly or indirectly facilitate or effect a business
combination, including any action to change or otherwise
affect the composition of the board of directors for that
purpose, must be called by 25 percent or more of the
56
voting power of all shares entitled to vote.
Shareholders of a Delaware corporation are not entitled to
demand a special meeting, no matter how significant their
ownership stake, unless so authorized by the corporation’s
57
certificate of incorporation or bylaws. “Corporations desiring to
avoid special meetings called by dissident shareholders prefer the
58
Delaware statute in this regard.”
The corporate statutes of most states, however, give
shareholders holding a specified percentage of shares the power to
call a special meeting. Thirty-two states have a 10% threshold, and
most, unlike Minnesota, do not increase the threshold if the action
59
sought is a change in control of the corporation. It is difficult to
indict a corporate statute that is substantially identical to a majority
of state corporate statutes and provides substantial shareholders
60
and shareholder groups the right to demand a meeting.
55. MINN. STAT. § 302A.433, subd. 1.
56. Id. subd. 1(a)-(c), (e).
57. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2001).
58. 18 MATHESON & GARON, supra note 10, § 1.5, at 9.
59. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.02 cmt. n.1 (2002) (no increased
threshold required).
60. Although Vaaler acknowledges the number of states that permit
shareholders to demand a special meeting, he argues that the MBCA’s 10%
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B. Default Provisions: Cumulative Voting and Preemptive Rights
The authors believe that the indictment of the MBCA’s default
provisions regarding cumulative voting and preemptive rights is
even less sustainable. In Scrap the Minnesota Business Corporation
61
Act!, Bryn Vaaler describes Minnesota’s default approach to
62
cumulative voting and preemptive rights as “wrong-headed.” He
reaches that conclusion because, under the MBCA, shareholders of
Minnesota corporations have cumulative voting rights and
preemptive rights unless the articles of incorporation provide
63
otherwise, whereas shareholders of Delaware corporations do not
have such rights unless the certificate of incorporation so
64
provides.
Most attorneys incorporating a Minnesota corporation
presumably are familiar with the MBCA and will provide in the
articles for the inapplicability of cumulative voting and preemptive
65
rights if that is the desire of the shareholders. Similarly, most
attorneys incorporating a Delaware corporation presumably are
familiar with the Delaware statute and will provide in the certificate
of incorporation for the applicability of cumulative voting and
66
preemptive rights if that is the desire of the shareholders. There
may be situations, however, in which an attorney fails to focus on
the treatment of cumulative voting or preemptive rights under the
applicable statute if the corporate charter is silent and situations in
which a corporation is incorporated without a lawyer by persons
unaware of the consequences if nothing is stated in the corporate
67
charter.
The “opt-in, opt-out” distinction between the two statutes, as it
threshold is too low. Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1390.
61. Vaaler, supra note 4.
62. Id. at 1371-72.
63. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.215, subd. 2 (cumulative voting), 302A.413, subd. 1
(preemptive rights) (2004). The MBCA’s default rule of preemptive rights does
not apply to securities that are issued for other than money consideration,
pursuant to a plan of merger or exchange, under a shareholder-approved benefit
plan, upon exercise of stock options or other rights to purchase securities, in a
public offering, or in a court-approved plan of reorganization. Id. § 302A.413,
subd. 4.
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(3) (preemptive rights), 214 (cumulative
voting) (2001); see also 18 MATHESON & GARON, supra note 10, § 1.5, at 11-12.
65. 18 MATHESON & GARON, supra note 10, § 1.5, at 12.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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pertains to cumulative voting and preemptive rights, would not
favor the Delaware statute over the Minnesota statute unless both
(1) a substantial number of persons incorporating Minnesota
corporations, or who become shareholders of Minnesota
corporations, that have not opted out of cumulative voting or
preemptive rights are unaware that those provisions apply because
there has been no opt-out, and (2) there is a substantially greater
likelihood that persons who were not aware of the consequences
would have preferred that cumulative voting and preemptive rights
68
not apply than that they do apply.
Cumulative voting and
preemptive rights are not inherently undesirable statutory
69
provisions.
There are presumably a substantial number of
shareholders who, even if they are not intimately familiar with the
concept of cumulative voting, would expect that a 49% shareholder
would have the right to some minority representation on the board
of directors and who would be surprised that this is not the default
70
A substantial number of minority
case under Delaware law.
shareholders may also be surprised to learn that their percentage
interests in a closely held corporation could be diluted by the
issuance of shares to new shareholders without the original
shareholders first having a right to purchase those shares on the
same terms unless preemptive rights are expressly provided for in
71
the charter of a Delaware corporation.
Which statute is more
72
likely to be a “trap for the unwary” is largely dependent upon what
the views of the unwary would be regarding the desirability of
73
cumulative voting and preemptive rights.
C. Anti-Takeover Provisions
Anti-takeover provisions in corporate statutes are among the
most controversial provisions in those statutes. Proponents believe
those statutes are very desirable means of protecting shareholders
against certain undesirable takeovers of public corporations, give
boards more time to evaluate proposed takeovers and consider
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1372-77 (describing the MBCA’s default
provisions in the areas of cumulative voting and preemptive rights).
73. 18 MATHESON & GARON, supra note 10, § 1.5, at 12.
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alternatives, and increase the negotiating positions of boards to
74
maximize shareholder value in the event of a takeover.
Opponents, which include many institutional shareholders and
organizations like Institutional Shareholder Services, maintain that
those statutes are contrary to good corporate governance, impair
the free operation of the market for corporate control, and reduce
75
shareholder value.
The authors believe that the anti-takeover
statutes in Minnesota, taken as a whole, make incorporation in
Minnesota attractive for publicly held corporations and privately
held corporations that are likely to become publicly held in the
future or that have a large number of shareholders.
76
77
Both Minnesota and Delaware have a Business Combination
Act. Both statutes provide that a substantial shareholder generally
cannot enter into a merger or certain other self-dealing
transactions with a publicly held corporation for a period of years
after becoming a substantial shareholder unless the corporation
pre-approves either the self-dealing transaction or the stock
acquisition that results in the shareholder becoming a substantial
78
shareholder.
The Minnesota statute is more effective than its
Delaware counterpart in furthering the objectives of proponents of
statutory anti-takeover protections, namely by
• deterring certain undesirable takeovers in which the
shareholders do not receive full value or are not treated
equally, particularly if a substantial portion of the takeover
price is paid with assets of the acquired corporation or as a
result of the collateralization of those assets upon a merger
of the company with the substantial shareholder or its
affiliates;
• giving the board of directors more time to evaluate the
74. See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative
Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1455
(1991) (“[T]he primary impact state legislation has upon shareholders qua
shareholders is the veto power and leverage it affords management in attempting
to achieve the highest possible price for the corporation.”) (footnote omitted).
75. See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on
Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the “Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1830 (2002) (“[V]irtually all academic commentators on both
sides of the [race-to-the-bottom vs. race-to-the-top] debate agree that state
antitakeover statutes generally reduce shareholder value.”) (footnote omitted).
76. MINN. STAT. § 302A.673 (2004).
77. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001 & Supp. 2004).
78. MINN. STAT. § 302A.673; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203.
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transaction and consider possible higher-value alternatives;
and
• increasing the negotiating position of the board of
directors to maximize the terms and conditions of any
79
takeover.
The ownership threshold under the respective Business
Combination Acts for being a substantial shareholder is 10% for a
Minnesota corporation compared to 15% for a Delaware
80
corporation. The moratorium period during which mergers or
other self-dealing transactions are prohibited is four years for a
Minnesota corporation and three years for a Delaware
81
corporation. In addition, the Delaware moratorium, unlike the
Minnesota moratorium, can be avoided if the shareholder,
immediately after the transaction in which it becomes a substantial
shareholder, owns at least 85% of the outstanding voting stock that
is not owned by persons who are both directors and officers or
82
The moratorium may also be
certain employee stock plans.
avoided by a substantial shareholder in Delaware if the transaction
in question is approved by both the board of directors and at least
two-thirds of the voting stock not owned by the substantial
83
shareholder.
As a result of Minnesota’s increased protections, a shareholder
holding less than 10% of the stock of a Minnesota corporation is
much more likely to seek pre-approval from the corporation before
crossing the 10% threshold because: (1) the shareholder will be
subject to the moratorium if it crosses the threshold; (2) the
moratorium is four years rather than three years; and (3) there are
no practical statutory exceptions to the moratorium. A similarly
situated shareholder of a Delaware corporation can acquire
another 5% of the corporation’s voting stock before crossing the
statutory threshold. The shareholder can then wage a proxy
contest to remove the directors, voting its 14.9% interest. If the
shareholder wins, the new board can pre-approve the transaction
and avoid the moratorium regardless of whether the old board
deemed the merger desirable and without giving the old board the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.673, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203.
MINN. STAT. § 302A.011, subd. 49(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(5).
MINN. STAT. § 302A.673, subd. 1(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2).
Id. § 203(a)(3).
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opportunity to negotiate better terms for shareholders generally.
Although a shareholder could use the same tactic with respect to a
Minnesota corporation, it would need to wage the proxy contest
from a 9.9% ownership position rather than a 14.9% ownership
84
position and would be less likely to prevail.
For those who oppose anti-takeover statutes on the theory that
they are generally skewed to be pro-management and antishareholder, the Minnesota Business Combination Act may be
more desirable than its Delaware counterpart in one respect. The
pre-approval sufficient to avoid the moratorium under the
Minnesota statute must be given by a committee composed solely of
one or more disinterested directors who have not been officers or
employees of the corporation or a related organization during the
preceding five years (or, if there are no such directors, by a
committee of three or more disinterested persons who are not
85
directors). The Delaware pre-approval is by the entire board of
86
directors, including the management directors.
While some criticize all anti-takeover statutes as being anti-free
market, others attack only one subset of those statutes, control
share statutes, as being ineffective and possibly facilitating
87
takeovers. Minnesota has such a statute, frequently referred to as
88
Twenty-seven states have
the Control Share Acquisition Act.
89
comparable statutes. Delaware does not.
The Minnesota Control Share Acquisition Act provides that if a
publicly held corporation with at least fifty shareholders of record
or any other Minnesota corporation with at least 100 shareholders
of record has a shareholder with 20% or more of the voting power
of the corporation’s outstanding shares, that holder can vote only

84. The only downside with respect to a Minnesota corporation would be if a
shareholder acquired between 10% and 15% of the stock without pre-approval
and later proposed a transaction that was clearly in the best interests of the
corporation. That shareholder would be precluded from completing that
transaction during the four-year moratorium period if it retains its percentage
stock ownership.
85. MINN. STAT. § 302A.673, subd. 1(d)(1)-(2).
86. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1).
87. 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE §
4.06[A], at 4-37 (6th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2004) (“[C]ontrol share statutes . . . have
not been particularly useful to target companies in defending against hostile bids
. . . [and] may be counterproductive.”).
88. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671.
89. 1 FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 87, § 4.01[A], n.152.
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20% of the corporation’s outstanding voting shares
90
There is an exception
(notwithstanding its stock ownership).
from the voting limitation if at any time the shareholders of the
corporation approve the grant of full voting power by the vote of
both a majority of the voting power of the corporation’s
outstanding shares and a majority of the voting power of the
outstanding shares that are not owned by the 20% shareholder or
91
by officers or employee directors of the corporation. However,
the meeting of shareholders cannot be held unless the 20%
shareholder provides the corporation, for redistribution to all of its
shareholders, certain information concerning itself and its plans
92
with respect to the corporation. In addition, the meeting is not
required unless, at the time the substantial shareholder delivers the
information described above, the substantial shareholder also has
definitive agreements in place for all acquisition financing that is
93
not to be provided with its own funds. Even if the shareholder
complies with all the conditions necessary to request the meeting,
the board has fifty-five days after satisfaction of the conditions to
94
hold the meeting, giving the board more time to evaluate the
proposed takeover and consider favorable alternatives to it.
The authors generally agree that the Minnesota Control Share
Acquisition Act is relatively ineffective, perhaps even
disadvantageous as an anti-takeover protection, because it provides
a referendum for the shareholders to vote in favor of the takeover,
although the statute does achieve a takeover-preparedness objective
of giving the board more time (up to fifty-five days after the
substantial shareholder has financing in place and has requested
95
the meeting of shareholders)
to evaluate the proposed
acquisition. It should be noted, however, that the referendum for
the shareholders generally facilitated by control share statutes is
less likely under the Minnesota statute than under its counterparts
in most states if the shareholder is simply intending to put the
corporation “in play” because the substantial shareholder cannot
force the referendum unless it has definitive financing in place.
90. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671. Similar restrictions apply at the 331/3% and
majority ownership thresholds. Id.
91. Id. subd. 4a.
92. Id. subds. 2, 3.
93. Id. subd. 4.
94. Id. subd. 3.
95. Id.
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The statute has also been criticized as posing “impediments to
96
routine transactions.” The authors have rarely found that to be
the case. The statute has exceptions that negate its effect with
respect to many of those routine transactions. Stock acquired
97
directly from the corporation is exempt from voting restrictions.
Likewise, there is an exception for tender offers and exchange
offers for all of a corporation’s stock that have been approved by a
committee of disinterested directors and result in ownership of
98
more than 50% of the voting stock of the corporation.
The
“routine transactions” that arguably may be impeded are therefore
presumably transactions which the authors submit are not at all
routine—the transfer by a shareholder to another shareholder of at
least 20% of the voting stock of the corporation, major
reorganizations of institutional owners of 20% or greater interests,
and certain voting proxies and stock options granted by
shareholders in proposed mergers to “lock up” the transaction
99
prior to the shareholder vote.
Concern has also been expressed about the application of the
statute to non-public corporations with 100 or more shareholders
100
of record.
The authors believe, however, that there are a very
limited number of non-public Minnesota corporations with 100 or
more shareholders of record. Furthermore, even among such
companies, takeover attempts occur in situations where protections
provided to shareholders of public companies under federal proxy
and tender offer rules are, for the most part, unavailable. It is
therefore arguable that the Minnesota anti-takeover statutes are
more important to non-public, non-closely held corporations than
to public corporations.
Moreover, a corporation can opt out of the statute at any time
by amending its articles or bylaws. Such an opt-out simply requires

96. Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1397.
97. MINN. STAT. § 302A.011, subd. 38(e) (2004).
98. Id. subd. 38(h).
99. Such a “lock-up” is not in the interests of a corporation’s shareholders
unless the inability to obtain it causes a potential acquirer to refuse to proceed
with an otherwise desirable acquisition or to offer a lower takeover premium in
order to compensate it for the risk that a third party will outbid it. See generally
Michael A. Stanchfield, Voting Lock-ups and Sales of Partially Owned Subsidiaries: Can
Shareholders Love a Deal Too Early and Too Much?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1325,
1358-61 (2002) (discussing the effects of lock-ups).
100. Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1396-97.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss2/6

20

Garon et al.: Challenging Delaware's Desirability as a Haven for Incorporation
09GARONSTANCHFIELDMATHESON.DOC

2006]

1/14/2006 5:57:31 PM

CHALLENGING DELAWARE’S DESIRABILITY

789

101

a shareholder vote.
Clients should be advised of the advantages
and disadvantages of the statute and consider on an informed basis
whether to opt out. Because opting out is not a difficult process,
the ability of Minnesota corporations to avail themselves of the
Control Share Acquisition Act unless they choose to opt out should
not be deemed a substantial disadvantage in light of the advantages
102
resulting from the MBCA and its other anti-takeover provisions.
D. Shareholder Remedies
While the authors believe that certain of the purported
disadvantages of the MBCA are overstated, one is not—section
302A.751 of the MBCA is a very troubling statute. With respect to
103
certain closely held corporations, section 302A.751 may itself be a
sufficient reason to incorporate in Delaware, despite the added
financial burdens, decreased flexibility, and more limited coverage

101. The vote is generally a vote of a majority of the voting power of the
outstanding shares plus a vote of a majority of the voting power of the shares held
by persons other than the substantial shareholder or officers or employee
directors. MINN. STAT. § 302A.671, subd. 1. However, unless the articles of
incorporation provide for a greater number or percentage, the required vote is
only a vote of holders of the greater of a majority of the voting power of the shares
present and entitled to vote or a majority of the voting power of the minimum
number of shares that would constitute a quorum if the amendment is approved
by a committee of directors each of whom (1) has not been an officer or employee
of the corporation or a related organization during the past five years; (2) is not
the substantial shareholder or an affiliate or associate of the substantial
shareholder and was not nominated for election by any such shareholder or by its
affiliates or associates; and (3) was a director when the substantial shareholder
became or proposed to become a 20% (or 331/3% or majority) shareholder or was
nominated, elected, or recommended for election by a majority of the directors
who were directors at the time the substantial shareholder became or proposed to
become a 20% (or 331/3% or majority) shareholder. Id.
102. The other anti-takeover provisions of the MBCA include a so-called “fair
price” provision, an “anti-greenmail” provision, and a multiple-constituency
statute. See id. § 302A.675 (an offeror may not acquire shares of a publicly held
corporation within two years after a takeover offer unless the selling shareholder is
offered substantially equivalent terms as those in the takeover offer or unless a
committee of disinterested directors agrees otherwise before any shares are
purchased in the tender offer); § 302A.553, subd. 3; § 302A.251, subd. 5 (discussed
in Part IV.A.3 infra).
103. The Minnesota legislature enacted section 302A.751 “in recognition that,
given the lack of a ready market for their shares, minority shareholders in closely
held corporations required enhanced protections.” Gunderson v. Alliance of
Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 184 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev. granted
(Minn. July 24, 2001), appeal dismissed (Minn. Aug. 17, 2001).
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104

of the Delaware statute.
Section 302A.751 allows a court to “grant any equitable relief it
deems just and reasonable in the circumstances” or to “dissolve a
corporation and liquidate its assets and business” when it is
established that:
(1)
the directors are deadlocked, and the shareholders are
unable to break the deadlock;
(2)
the directors or other controlling persons have acted
fraudulently or illegally toward shareholders in their
capacity as shareholders or directors, or in the case of a
closely held corporation, as officers or employees;
(3)
the directors or other controlling persons have acted in
a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more
shareholders in their capacities as shareholders or
directors of a corporation that is not a publicly held
corporation or as officers or employees of a closely held
corporation;
(4)
the shareholders are so divided in voting power that for
the period including two consecutive regular meetings,
they have failed to elect successors to directors;
(5)
corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted; or
(6)
the duration of the corporation has expired and has
105
not been extended.
Although in theory section 302A.751 applies to all Minnesota
corporations, in practice it has rarely, if ever, been applied to
106
publicly held corporations.
Court-determined equitable-relief provisions such as section
302A.751 are not troubling in shareholder actions when directors
are deadlocked and the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock, when the shareholders are unable to elect directors, or
when waste of corporate assets or fraud is occurring. The Model

104. The Delaware statute includes a subchapter containing special provisions
for close corporations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, subch. XIV (2001). Unlike section
302A.751, however, a Delaware corporation must affirmatively opt-in to the
subchapter if its provisions are to apply to the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§§ 341-344 (2001). The Delaware Supreme Court has declined to create any
special rules to protect minority shareholders in a closely held corporation. Nixon
v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379-81 (Del. 1993).
105. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1 (2004).
106. A recent search of all reported state and federal cases did not reveal any
instances of section 302A.751 actions against publicly held corporations.
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Business Corporation Act, for example, allows judicial dissolution
by shareholder action, but does not expressly permit a court to
107
impose other equitable remedies, in each of those four situations.
The most troubling and distinguishing aspect of section
302A.751 is that equitable relief can be granted to shareholders in
any Minnesota non-public corporation when it is established that
directors or those in control of the corporation have acted in a
manner that is “unfairly prejudicial” toward shareholders in their
108
capacities as shareholders or directors of the corporation.
For a nonpublic closely held corporation (i.e., thirty-five or less shareholders
109
of record), the statute also authorizes courts to grant relief if the
directors or those in control of the corporation have acted in a
manner unfairly prejudicial toward shareholders in their capacities as
110
officers or employees.
No definition of the term “unfairly
prejudicial” is given in the statute. The courts have noted that
unfairly prejudicial conduct likely includes breaches of fiduciary
111
duty, but that it does not include the failure to fulfill a minority
112
shareholder’s “subjective hopes and desires.”
Whether practitioners view this basis for equitable relief as
113
undermining basic principles of contract and employment law or
as a necessary protection for oppressed minority shareholders with
107. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.30 (2005). The significant distinction
between the Model Act and section 302A.751 is that the latter includes a provision
allowing judicial dissolution or other relief when directors of non-public
corporations have acted in a manner unfairly prejudicial toward one or more of
their shareholders, while the Model Act contains no such standard. Compare MINN.
STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(3), with MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §14.30. Although the
Model Act does not expressly authorize a court to compel the corporation or
other shareholders to purchase the plaintiff-shareholder’s shares for fair value in
lieu of dissolution, it does permit the corporation or the other shareholders to
voluntarily elect to do so. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.34.
108. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(3).
109. Id. § 302A.011, subd. 6a.
110. Id. § 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(3).
111. Berreman v. West Publ’g Co., 615 N.W.2d 362, 373 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000).
112. Gunderson v. Alliance of Computer Prof’ls, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 173, 191
(Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev. granted (Minn. July 24, 2001), appeal dismissed (Minn.
Aug. 17, 2001) (citing In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y.
1984)).
113. See Gunderson, 628 N.W.2d at 190-92 (holding that, although the plaintiff’s
rights as an at-will employee were fixed by law and that his rights as a shareholder were
set forth in a buy-sell agreement, his rights as a shareholder-employee were not and
thus could form the basis of a claim under section 302A.751); see generally Vaaler,
supra note 4, at 1409.
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no other way to receive the full value of their investment depends
in large part upon whether the attorney is representing or suing
the directors or controlling shareholders. From a structural
standpoint, however, section 302A.751 burdens closely held
corporations and, to a lesser extent, other non-public corporations
by encouraging perpetual judicial second-guessing of corporate
115
decisions.
Once the threshold for bringing a shareholder action is met
under section 302A.751, the courts have wide judicial discretion to
order equitable relief. The statute provides that, in determining
whether to order equitable relief, courts should consider the duty
shareholders in closely held corporations owe one another “to act in an
honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the operation of the
corporation and the reasonable expectations of all shareholders as
they exist at the inception and develop during the course of the
shareholders’ relationship with the corporation and with each
116
other.”
One instance of a failure by a director or controlling
shareholder to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable manner in the
operation of the corporation may be deemed to constitute acting in
a manner unfairly prejudicial toward those shareholders—thereby
117
entitling a court to impose equitable relief. Although the authors
114. See Joseph W. Anthony & Karlyn Vegoe Boraas, Betrayed, Belittled . . . But
Triumphant Claims of Shareholders in Closely Held Corporations, 22 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1173, 1175-76 (1996).
115. E.g., Pooley v. Mankato Iron & Metal, Inc., 513 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that the board’s decision to remove an officer/director of the
family-owned business after he was convicted for assaulting another director was
unfair prejudice triggering a full-value buyout under section 302A.751).
116. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd. 3a (2004). But see Advanced Commc’n
Design, Inc. v. Follett, 615 N.W.2d 285, 294 (Minn. 2000) (holding that a minority
shareholder holding only nonvoting stock in a closely held corporation did not
owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, which was controlled by one shareholder
who held all of the voting stock and served as the corporation’s only director, or to
its other shareholders); Wiltse v. Boarder Fin. Servs., Inc., No. A03-852, 2004 WL
771493, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2004) (holding that buy-out offer to
minority shareholder was reasonable and that his expectation of a higher price was
unreasonable).
117. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes, 1981,
Bert Black); Sawyer v. Curt & Co., Inc., Nos. C7-90-2040, C9-90-2040, 1991 WL
65320, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991). The Sawyer court used the language,
“[t]his one incident of unfairly prejudicial conduct is enough to justify the trial
court’s grant of the motion for a buy-out under MINN. STAT. § 302A.751, subd.
1(b)(2).” Id. This excerpt quotes the “unfairly prejudicial” standard in the
current section 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(3), but cites to the current fraudulent or
illegal standard of section 302A.751, subd. 1(b)(2)). See id.
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do not believe it to be the intent of the statute, certain Minnesota
courts have reached the conclusion that a controlling shareholder
of a closely held corporation acting contrary to “the reasonable
expectations of all shareholders” also is acting in a manner
“unfairly prejudicial” toward shareholders, thereby enabling the
court to impose equitable relief even if the controlling shareholder
did not otherwise act in a manner unfairly prejudicial to the
118
shareholders.
Minnesota courts have utilized the permitted equitable
remedies in section 302A.751 to award minority shareholders of
closely held corporations broad remedies including buyout and
119
dissolution of the closely held corporation.
Minnesota courts
have also allowed broad remedies and awards using the “reasonable
expectations” standard for minority shareholders. For instance,
shareholders who are employees may have a reasonable
120
expectation of continued lifetime employment in addition to the
118. Borrowing language from another part of section 302A.751, Minnesota
courts have concluded that unfairly prejudicial conduct under section 302A.751
“is conduct that frustrates the reasonable expectations of shareholders in their
capacity as shareholders or directors of a corporation that is not publicly held or as
officers or employees of a closely held corporation.” Berreman v. West Publ’g Co.,
615 N.W.2d 362, 374 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); see Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v.
VanHercke, No. A03-1584, 2004 WL 1445126, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 29, 2004)
(citing Gunderson, 628 N.W.2d at 184); Wiltse, 2004 WL 771493, at *2; Sawyer, 1991
WL 65320, at *2; see also Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not Good Faith? The Foibles of
Fairness in the Law of Close Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1143, 1155 (1990)
(noting the distinction between the contract-like “reasonable expectations”
analysis and the tort-like analysis applied to actions that might be deemed, in the
language of the Minnesota statute, unfairly prejudicial).
119. See, e.g., Signal Bank Nat’l Assoc. v. Kemnitz Sand & Gravel, Inc., No. C102-274, 2002 WL 31415422, at *4-5 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2002); Pooley, 513
N.W.2d at 838.
120. Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 802 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing
Joseph E. Olson, A Statutory Elixir for the Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627,
629 (1985)); see Sawyer, 1991 WL 65320, at *2. Although reasonable expectations
of employees in a closely held corporation can include continued or lifetime
employment, more recent case law indicates there are limits to this “reasonable”
expectation. In Gunderson, the court held that an expectation of continuing
employment is reasonable if continuing employment was part of the shareholder’s
investment and was known and accepted by other shareholders, properly balanced
against the majority or controlling shareholders’ need for flexibility in running
the business. 628 N.W.2d at 191. In Production Resource Group, L.L.C. v. Van Hercke,
the court held that a shareholder’s expectation of continued employment is not
reasonable when the employee-shareholder is terminated for misconduct or
incompetence or when violation of the terms of an employment agreement would
justify termination for misconduct. 2004 WL 1445126, at *3. Also, in Regan v.
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right to be bought out at full value in a section 302A.751 action.
The obligations imposed on closely held corporations as a result of
section 302A.751 combined with the court precedent that it only
takes one instance of alleged inequitable treatment to bring a
section 302A.751 action creates substantial planning difficulties for
practitioners and their closely held clients.
Finally, the courts in section 302A.751 cases have determined
that buy-out remedies in favor of minority shareholders should not
122
be subject to minority discounts.
Not applying a discount is
Natural Resources Group, Inc., the court held that shareholder status alone is not
sufficient to create a reasonable expectation of continued employment, and that
written agreements among shareholders or between shareholders and the
corporation should be heavily weighed to determine what are “reasonable
expectations” of a shareholder. 345 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1012-13 (D. Minn. 2004).
121. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d at 802-03. This is not to say that Minnesota courts will
disregard an explicit agreement between the parties.
In Gunderson, the
shareholders’ agreed valuation method resulted in a purchase price lower than
the appraised value. 628 N.W.2d at 187. The court stated that Minnesota courts
are required to honor shareholder agreements setting the purchase price of
shares, unless the court determines that the price is unreasonable under all
circumstances. Id.
122. See, e.g., Pooley, 513 N.W.2d at 838 (citing Spinnaker Software Corp. v.
Nicholson, 495 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); MT Prop., Inc. v. CMC
Real Estate Corp., 481 N.W.2d 383, 388 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)). If a minority
discount is not applied, then a 1% shareholder of a corporation worth $100
million, for example, should be entitled to 1% of $100 million without any
discount—meaning that the 1% shareholder’s shares are as valuable on a pershare basis as a 99% shareholder’s shares. This contradicts the generally accepted
principle that control of a corporation has value over and above the value of the
shares that give that control—a so-called “control premium.” See, e.g., Paramount
Commc’n Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42-43 (Del. 1994) (describing
control premiums). Separate from a minority discount, but also relevant to any
discussion regarding the fair value of shares subject to a buy-out remedy, is the
issue of whether marketability discounts may be applied in section 302A.751
actions. A marketability discount “‘adjusts for a lack of liquidity in one’s interest
in an entity’ and should be distinguished from a minority discount, which adjusts
for lack of control of the corporation.” Advanced Commc’n Design, Inc. v. Follett,
615 N.W.2d 285, 291 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Balsamides v. Protameen Chem., Inc.,
734 A.2d 721, 733 (N.J. 1999)). The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the A.L.I.
standard for court-ordered buyouts pursuant to section 302A.751: Absent
extraordinary circumstances, fair value in a court-ordered buy-out means a pro
rata share of the value of the corporation as a going concern without discount for
lack of marketability. Id. at 292-93 (applying the general standard but holding that
extraordinary circumstances required the application of a marketability discount
because to do otherwise would result in an unfair transfer of wealth from the
remaining shareholders to the plaintiff). A Minnesota federal court used the
standard in Advanced Communication Design to validate a 30% marketability
discount, holding that, “[a]pplication of the marketability discount would not
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logical in the merger context when shareholders exercising
statutory dissenters’ rights have been forced out of corporations
and all shareholders are receiving the same per-share merger
123
consideration.
Unfortunately, these dissenters’ rights cases have
been used as precedent for minority discount restrictions in section
302A.751 actions despite the differences in context between a
shareholder’s exercise of statutory dissenters’ rights and a court’s
imposition of a shareholder buyout sought by the shareholder
124
under section 302A.751.
Unlike the other provisions of the MBCA that are designed to
promote predictability for those organizing and operating a
corporation, section 302A.751 uses undefined concepts and grants
of broad discretionary authority for judicial second-guessing. In
this regard, section 302A.751 contains many of the negative
qualities for which the authors criticize the Delaware corporate
125
statute as a whole.
E. Dissenters’ Rights
Vaaler’s article, Scrap the Minnesota Business Corporation Act!, was
126
written in 2002. At that time, he was critical of Minnesota’s theneffective dissenters’ rights provisions. His major criticisms fell into
the following categories:
• the MBCA at that time did not contain a so-called “market
127
out” exception in the merger context;
• the MBCA affords dissenters’ rights in a transaction

result in an unfair wealth transfer to either party.” Regan, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1009
(citing to the buy-out provision in the company’s stock purchase agreement
stating that the appraiser in a buyout should apply an aggregate discount of 30%).
123. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 39, § 22.21 (discussing the rationale for the
lack of a minority discount in the acquisition context and citing cases).
124. A key distinction between a merger and a court imposed shareholder
buyout without a minority discount is that a court-imposed shareholder buyout
could be ordered at a time when the corporation may not have liquid assets even
to pay a discounted amount and is less likely to have the cash flow to pay a prorated portion of the total value of the corporation to the minority shareholder.
Moreover, in dissenters’ rights cases, the corporation has affirmatively elected to
engage in a transaction that would trigger those rights.
125. See infra Part IV.B.
126. Vaaler, supra note 4.
127. That is, an exception that denies dissenters’ rights in situations where the
dissenter owns shares that are publicly traded and receives in exchange for those
shares in the merger publicly traded shares of another corporation.
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involving the sale of assets of a corporation, if the
transaction requires shareholder approval under the
128
MBCA;
• the MBCA affords dissenters’ rights with respect to an
amendment of the articles of incorporation that materially
and adversely affects the rights of dissenting shareholders
with respect to preferences, voting, cumulative voting,
129
redemption, or preemptive rights;
• in addition to allowing a dissenter to be paid before all
claims are resolved, the MBCA assesses costs of a demand
and/or court petition against the corporation unless the
dissenter’s actions in exercising its rights are deemed
arbitrary, vexatious and not in good faith, and authorizes a
court, if it finds the corporation failed to substantially
comply with the dissenters rights procedure under the
MBCA, to assess against the corporation such costs of
130
experts and attorneys as the court deems equitable; and
• the MBCA did not allow a corporation to eliminate
dissenters’ rights for classes or series of shares in its articles
131
of incorporation.
Although several of these criticisms had merit in 2002, recent
amendments to the dissenters’ rights provisions of the MBCA have
corrected many of the disadvantages. Amendments to the MBCA
in 2004 created a market-out exception from dissenters’ rights
similar to that contained in the Delaware statute in the context of a
stock-for-stock merger transaction involving publicly traded
132
corporations.
The MBCA also now permits a corporation to
eliminate dissenters’ rights that are otherwise triggered by certain
133
It is true that the MBCA authorizes
amendments to the articles.
dissenters’ rights with respect to a sale or other disposition of
134
substantially all assets. The authors feel, however, that it is more
128. MINN. STAT. § 302A.471, subd. 1(b) (2004).
129. Id. subd. 1(a).
130. Id. § 302A.473, subd. 8.
131. Vaaler, supra note 4.
132. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.471, subd. 3(c), with DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
262(b) (2001).
133. MINN. STAT. § 302A.471, subd. 1(a). An amendment to the articles to
eliminate those triggers for dissenters’ rights itself entitles shareholders to
dissenters’ rights. Id.
134. Id. subd. 1(b). The statute makes an exception for dispositions for cash
on terms providing that the net proceeds would be distributed to shareholders pro
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difficult to defend the reasons for treating mergers and sales of
substantially all assets differently under the Delaware appraisal
statute than it is to defend the reasons for treating them the same
under the MBCA.
From a procedural aspect, the criticisms of the Minnesota
dissenters’ rights statute can be justified only if viewed with an eye
toward discouraging any exercise of dissenters’ rights or delaying
135
payment on the dissenting shares.
For instance, under the
MBCA, dissenting shareholders receive what the corporation
estimates to be the fair value of their shares after the later of the
corporate action’s effectiveness (e.g., the effective time of a
merger) or after the corporation receives a valid demand for
136
payment from the dissenting shareholder.
The demand for
payment is not made until notice is given to shareholders who have
informed the corporation of their intent to dissent and the
corporation is not required to give that notice until an unspecified
period after the final corporate approval (either by the board or
the shareholders, as the case may be) of the action. In a merger
situation, shareholders who do not dissent receive the merger
consideration shortly after the merger. Why shouldn’t dissenting
shareholders be entitled to receive, several weeks after the merger,
payment of the amount (normally the same per-share merger
consideration) the corporation believes to be the fair value of the
137
shares?
The authors’ only criticism of the procedural aspects of

rata within a year. Id.
135. The procedural aspects of Delaware’s appraisal statute, including
substantial delays in obtaining payment for shares and the absence of an attorneys’
fee provision (other than the ability of a shareholder to request that the fees
incurred by the shareholder be charged pro rata against all of the shares entitled
to appraisal), would seem to discourage the exercise of dissenters’ rights in all but
the most egregious circumstances. See Joseph Evan Calio, New Appraisals of Old
Problems: Reflections on the Delaware Appraisal Proceeding, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 63 (1994)
(concluding, after a review of Delaware’s appraisal statute, that “the effect of
liberalizing the appraisal remedy has increased the costs and length of an
appraisal while diluting the Chancellor’s historical power of being able to shape a
remedy as equity dictates”).
136. MINN. STAT. § 302A.473, subd. 5(b). With respect to a dissenter who did
not become a shareholder until after the public announcement of the corporate
action giving rise to dissenters’ rights, no such payment need be made until the
earlier of the conclusion of the court action or the dissenter’s agreement to accept
the corporation’s estimate of fair value. Id.
137. The dissenting shareholder, of course, may not agree to that valuation
and retains the opportunity to try to obtain a higher price. Id. subd. 6.
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the MBCA dissenters’ rights provisions is that they do not permit
the corporation to recover from a dissenting shareholder any
excess paid to the shareholder by the corporation as its estimate of
fair value if the court later determines the fair value of the shares is
138
less than the amount the corporation originally paid.
F.

Class or Series Voting

When available, class or series voting elevates the position of
certain classes or series of shareholders by giving a class or series of
otherwise non-voting shareholders or shareholders with an
aggregate minority voting interest in the corporation a statutorily
mandated veto power over a transaction. As was the case with
respect to statutory dissenters’ rights under the MBCA in 2002,
Vaaler felt the MBCA class- and series-voting rights in 2002 were too
139
extensive.
The list of events under the MBCA provision in effect in 2002
entitled shares to class- or series-voting rights in several more events
than the Delaware statute (ten listed events under the MBCA versus
140
three under the Delaware statute). The 2004 amendments to the
MBCA reduce that list from ten items to eight, most importantly by
the elimination of class- or series-voting rights in the event of a
proposed increase or decrease in the aggregate number of
141
authorized shares of that class or series.
Comparing the rough
numbers (eight items versus three items triggering class- or seriesvoting rights) is somewhat misleading. One of Delaware’s three
class-voting events is the increase or decrease in the aggregate
142
number of authorized shares of the class, an item eliminated as a
class-voting trigger by the 2004 amendments to the MBCA. The
second class vote in Delaware is an increase or decrease in par
143
value of the shares of the class, which is not included in the
MBCA because par value is not a meaningful concept under the
144
MBCA.
The third “item” in the Delaware list is really a catch-all
138. Id. subd. 7.
139. See Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1381.
140. MINN. STAT. § 302A.137.
141. See Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1381.
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2001). This trigger for class voting
may be eliminated in a corporation’s original certificate of incorporation or by
amendment thereto. Id.
143. Id.
144. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.401 (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes, 1981).
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item—any amendment to the certificate of incorporation that
would “alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of
145
the shares of such class so as to affect them adversely.”
The
remaining items in the MBCA that are missing in Delaware are
amendments that would result in an exchange, reclassification, or
cancellation of shares of the class or series or of another class or
series for that class or series; combine outstanding shares of the
class or series into a lesser number of shares of the class or series
(i.e., a reverse stock split) in a transaction requiring a shareholder
vote unless each other class and series is subject to a similar
146
combination; divide the class into series with differing rights and
preferences or authorize the board to do so; create a new class or
series with rights and preferences superior to the class or series by
amendment to the articles of incorporation rather than through a
certificate of designation authorized in the existing articles of
incorporation; increase the rights and preferences or the number
of authorized shares of a class or series with superior rights; limit or
deny existing preemptive rights; or cancel distributions on the class
147
or series that have accrued but have not been declared. Many of
those specific items arguably would be included in the Delaware
catch-all for amendments to the certificate that would “alter or
change the powers, preferences, or special rights of a class or series
148
so as to affect them adversely.”
Therefore, the class- and seriesvoting rights under the MBCA are not substantially broader than
those under the Delaware statute.
G. Articles and Bylaw Amendments
Vaaler apparently believes that shareholders in Minnesota have
too much power with respect to amendments of articles of
149
incorporation. He criticizes the MBCA for permitting holders of
145. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2).
146. Generally, however, a reverse stock split by a Minnesota corporation will
not require a shareholder vote if the number of authorized shares of the
combined class or series is proportionately decreased. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.402
(2004).
147. MINN. STAT. § 302A.137.
148. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b). This is one of numerous examples of
provisions that are vague in the Delaware statute and therefore susceptible to
uncertainty and inconsistent judicial interpretation, whereas they are dealt with
precisely in the MBCA. See infra Part IV.A.
149. See Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1385-86.
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3% or more of the voting power of the shares of a Minnesota
corporation to propose amendments to the articles of
incorporation even if the board of directors does not approve of
150
the proposed amendment.
Under the Delaware statute, the
board must approve any proposed amendment to the certificate of
incorporation before the amendment can be submitted to
151
shareholders.
Whether the balance of shareholder/director
rights in this regard is disadvantageous is debatable depending on
the interests of the parties to the debate.
Interestingly, the MBCA provides similarly for amendments to
the bylaws if proposed by holders of 3% or more of the voting
power of the shares of the corporation, whereas the Delaware
statute suggests that the shareholders could vote to amend the
bylaws even if the amendment is not proposed by either the board
152
or shareholders with at least a minimum percentage stake.
In
that respect, the Delaware statute shifts more toward the rights of
153
shareholders.
Vaaler is also concerned about the limitations upon the
board’s ability under the MBCA to unilaterally amend bylaws
prescribing procedures for removing directors, filling vacancies in
the board, fixing the number of directors (except to increase the
number), their classifications, qualifications, or terms of office or
154
fixing a quorum for shareholder meetings.
Although he is
150. See id. (discussing MINN. STAT. § 302A.135, subd. 2 (2002)).
151. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b).
152. Compare MINN. STAT. § 302A.181, subd. 3 (2004), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 109(a).
153. There is an argument under either statute, however, that amendments to
the bylaws (or, in Minnesota, the articles or the bylaws) may not be made by
shareholders that restrict the power of the board of directors to manage the
corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (the business and affairs of a
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors,
except as otherwise provided in the Delaware statute or the corporation’s
certificate of incorporation); MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.111, subd. 5, 302A.181, subd. 1
(articles and bylaws may not contain provisions that are inconsistent with MINN.
STAT. § 302A.201, which provides that, subject to limited exceptions, a
corporation’s business and affairs must be managed by or under the direction of
the board of directors). But see Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters Gen. Fund v. Fleming Cos.,
975 P.2d 907, 912 (Okla. 1999) (stating that a shareholder-proposed bylaw
amendment that would prevent the board from implementing a “poison pill”
without shareholder approval is permissible, despite Oklahoma statutory language
comparable to that in the Delaware statute).
154. See Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1391-92 (discussing MINN. STAT. § 302A.181,
subd. 2). Two other states similarly provide for certain bylaws that directors may
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correct in his assessment that this statute can frustrate attempts to
“clean up” bylaw provisions in these areas without going back to the
shareholders, the logic of the restrictions on a board of directors’
unilateral right to amend such bylaw provisions is difficult to
dispute. Allowing directors to extend their own terms of office or
change qualifications for directors does not appear to establish
appropriate checks and balances in the governance of the
corporation.
The argument that shareholders can protect
themselves through the ability to re-amend the bylaws at the next
annual meeting is not sufficient as a practical matter. Shareholders
do not tend to have that level of proactivity with respect to bylaw
amendments. Indeed, Vaaler has advocated giving directors the
right to unilaterally amend bylaw provisions affecting their
qualifications and terms because of the difficulty of going back to
the shareholders, even if the directors are proponents of the
155
changes.
H. Indemnification
The basic difference between the Minnesota and Delaware
indemnification statutes is that the Minnesota statute generally
provides for mandatory indemnification of directors, officers,
committee members, and employees by the corporation and
mandatory advances of expenses incurred by directors, officers,
committee members, and employees in proceedings against
156
whereas the Delaware statute is permissive in these
them,
157
respects.
As a corollary to this distinction, the Minnesota statute
does not permit indemnification of, or advances to, directors,
officers, committee members, or employees unless the statutory
158
conditions to indemnification and advances are satisfied, whereas
the Delaware statute on its face states that the statutory provisions
159
are not exclusive.
The MBCA generally provides that a Minnesota corporation
must indemnify, among others, a present or former director or
officer of the corporation against “judgments, penalties, fines, . . .
not amend. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.20 (2002) (statutory comparison).
155. Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1391-92.
156. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521.
157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145.
158. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521.
159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

33

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
09GARONSTANCHFIELDMATHESON.DOC

802

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

1/14/2006 5:57:31 PM

[Vol. 32:2

settlements, and reasonable expenses, including attorneys’ fees and
disbursements, incurred by the person” in connection with
threatened or pending litigation or administrative, arbitration, or
investigative proceedings arising because of the person’s acting as a
director, officer, committee member, or employee of the
160
corporation, if certain criteria are satisfied.
Those criteria in
161
non-criminal cases are that the person:
• has not been indemnified by another organization or
employee benefit plan for the same payments;
• has acted in “good faith” (which is defined as “honesty in
162
fact,” without regard to whether the action that is the
subject of the proceeding turns out to have been prudent);
• received no improper personal benefit from the conduct
that resulted in the proceeding; and
• reasonably believed that the action that led to the pending
or threatened proceeding was in the best interests of the
corporation.
The determination as to whether the criteria for mandatory
indemnification set forth above have been satisfied can be made
163
under the statute only by one of the following four parties:
• The board of directors of the corporation; but the board
may not make the determination if 50% or more of the
board members are parties to the proceeding.
• A committee of the board composed of two or more
directors who are not parties to the proceeding if a quorum
of the board consisting of disinterested directors cannot be
obtained.
• Special legal counsel, if that counsel has never previously
represented the corporation (or any parent, subsidiary,
sister corporation or other related organization) or any
director, officer, committee member, or employee whose
164
indemnification is at issue.
• The shareholders, provided that the shares held by parties
to the proceeding are not entitled to vote on the matter or

160. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subd. 2(a).
161. Id.
162. Id. § 302A.011, subd. 13.
163. Id. § 302A.521, subd. 6. An adverse determination can be overturned by a
Minnesota court, however. Id.
164. See id. subd. 19(e) (defining special legal counsel).
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to be counted in determining a quorum of shareholders.
The Delaware statute gives the corporation the power, but not
the obligation, to indemnify, among others, an existing or former
director or officer of a Delaware corporation who satisfies the
166
following criteria in non-criminal cases:
• the person acted in good faith; and
• the person reasonably believed the action to be in, or not
opposed to, the best interests of the corporation.
These standards are fairly consistent with those set forth in the
167
MBCA.
The parties who determine whether the Delaware statutory
standards for indemnification have been satisfied are fairly
comparable to those making the decision for a Minnesota
168
corporation: (1) directors who are not parties, by a majority vote
even if less than a quorum; (2) a committee of disinterested
directors designated by majority vote of such directors; (3)
independent legal counsel if there are no disinterested directors or
if a majority of the disinterested directors so directs; or (4) the
shareholders.
Although the Minnesota statute arguably is more beneficial to
directors and officers because indemnification is mandatory if the
statutory standards are satisfied, in practice there is little difference.
Delaware corporations generally will provide in their certificates of
incorporation, bylaws, or indemnification agreements with
directors and officers that the corporation must indemnify its
directors and officers to the fullest extent permitted by Delaware
law.
The Minnesota statute, however, clearly is beneficial to

165. The MBCA includes procedures for court relief if an adverse
determination is made or no determination is made within a stated period. Id.
subd. 6(a)(5). The Delaware statute, in contrast, is silent regarding the rights of
one seeking indemnification in such a situation. This is one of the reasons that
Delaware corporations often have indemnification agreements and more detailed
charter or bylaw provisions regarding indemnification than Minnesota
corporations.
166. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001).
167. From the standpoint of strict logic, it should be easier to satisfy the
standard in Delaware that the allegedly actionable behavior was reasonably
believed not to be opposed to the best interests of the corporation than the
standard in Minnesota that the behavior was reasonably believed to be in the best
interests of the corporation.
168. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d).
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directors and officers with respect to derivative actions. For
Minnesota corporations, indemnification for payments in those
actions is treated the same as in any other proceeding, except that
indemnification amounts paid in any derivative action must be
reported to the shareholders of a Minnesota corporation in writing
169
not later than the next meeting of shareholders.
The Delaware
statute, on the other hand, precludes indemnification of directors
and officers for settlement payments and judgments arising out of
derivative actions, and permits payment of a director’s or officer’s
expenses in such a derivative action in which the person has been
adjudicated to be liable only if a court determines that such person
170
is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such expenses.
While the Delaware statute is arguably more beneficial to
directors and officers because it expressly provides that it is not
171
exclusive of any other indemnification rights,
any such
indemnification rights would nevertheless be subject to the public
172
policy determinations underlying the statutory limitations.
Although indemnification agreements can be used to make
permissive indemnification mandatory under the Delaware nonexclusivity provision or to establish indemnification procedures
that are not covered at all in the statute, the courts have expressly
determined that it cannot be used to avoid the statutory standards
173
for indemnification, such as good faith.
With respect to indemnification itself, there thus do not
appear to be significant advantages to being governed by the
Minnesota or Delaware statute. With respect to payment or
reimbursement by the corporation for expenses of a director or
officer before a final determination regarding indemnification, the
director or officer clearly is better off being with a Delaware
174
corporation.
Under the Delaware statute, such advances may be
169.
170.
171.
172.

MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subds. 1(d), 8.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b).
Id. § 145(f).
R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.26 (3d ed. Supp. 2004).
173. See, e.g., Waltuch v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 88 F.3d 87, 90-95 (2d Cir.
1996) (holding that section 145 of the Delaware statute does not confer authority
on a corporation to indemnify an officer who did not act in good faith, regardless
of section 145(f)); Vonfeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A. 15688, 1999 WL 413393,
at *2 (Del. Ch. June 11, 1999) (reiterating the Waltuch holding).
174. While the MBCA provides for mandatory payment of such expenses if the
statutory standards are satisfied, the Delaware statute provides that a corporation
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made before the final disposition of the proceeding upon receipt
of an undertaking by or on behalf of the director or officer to repay
the amounts advanced if it ultimately is determined that the person
175
has not satisfied the statutory standards for indemnification.
Under the MBCA, such advances must be made (not only to
officers and directors but also to employees and committee
members unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws expressly
176
preclude advances to them), but there are three prerequisites:
• The person receiving the advance must make a written
undertaking of the nature required under the Delaware
statute to repay all advances if it is ultimately determined
that the statutory standards for indemnification have not
been satisfied.
• The person receiving the advance must affirm in writing a
good faith belief that the statutory standards for such
person’s indemnification have been satisfied.
• One of the parties entitled to make the final determination
as to whether the indemnification criteria have been
satisfied must determine that the facts then known to that
party would not preclude indemnification under the
MBCA.
The last criterion for advances under the MBCA is becoming
more difficult to satisfy as a practical matter. The reason is that
plaintiffs’ attorneys today are more prone to sue all directors,
particularly in derivative actions, for actions that do not personally
177
benefit outside directors. This precludes any board or committee
members from approving the advances under the MBCA and
effectively requires many corporations to select a special legal
counsel earlier in the proceeding than seems prudent. Moreover,
it frequently is difficult to find a special legal counsel that fulfills
the statutory requirement in Minnesota that the counsel must not
have ever represented the corporation or a related organization or
any director, officer, member of a committee, or employee whose
may provide such advances. Nevertheless, the certificate of incorporation, bylaws,
or indemnification agreements of a Delaware corporation generally will negate
this disadvantage by providing for advances of expenses to directors and officers to
the fullest extent permitted by law.
175. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e).
176. MINN. STAT. § 302A.521, subd. 3 (2004).
177. For example, innocent accounting errors resulting in restatements of
financial statements.
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indemnification is at issue.
On balance, the authors do not believe that the differences in
indemnification merit incorporation in Delaware over
incorporation in Minnesota or vice versa.
Just as the MBCA has its advantages over the Delaware statute,
there are a number of areas in which the Delaware statute is
preferable. An objective analysis of the purported advantages of
Delaware, however, shows that some are not advantages at all and
that others are not as advantageous as many believe.
IV. COMPARATIVE CODIFICATION
The most important and far-reaching difference between the
MBCA and other similar state corporate statutes, on the one hand,
and their Delaware counterpart, on the other, is the level of
codification of corporate law in the statutes. This section discusses
the different philosophies regarding the codification of corporate
law underlying these corporate statutes, and the various impacts
they have on key corporate stakeholders. The MBCA and similar
statutes are much more detailed and extensive in scope than the
Delaware statute and include more precise definitions of terms
used in the statutes. The Delaware philosophy has generally been
to create a minimalist statute and leave to the courts the
responsibility for filling in the gaps. The authors believe that this
comparison of these statutes favors the MBCA and its counterparts
in other states over Delaware.
A. Increased Codification Under the MBCA Versus Delaware
1.

Standard of Conduct for Directors and Officers

The different philosophies regarding the level of codification
of corporate law of the two states manifests itself in the basic
standard of conduct for directors and officers of Minnesota and
Delaware corporations. The MBCA expressly sets forth the
standard of conduct for directors. It provides that a director shall
discharge his or her duties “in good faith, in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
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178

would exercise under similar circumstances.”
The statutory
179
Delaware
standard for officers is identical to that for directors.
has no statutory definition of the standard of conduct of directors
or officers, thereby defaulting to the courts to develop the
standard.
2.

Statutory Definition of Good Faith

The concept of good faith is a basic element of the standard of
conduct for directors and officers and is central to their protection
through statutory indemnification and exculpation. Directors and
officers cannot satisfy their fiduciary duties under the MBCA unless
180
they act in good faith.
A Minnesota corporation cannot
indemnify a director or officer who is determined not to have acted
181
Moreover, a Minnesota corporation may, in its
in good faith.
articles of incorporation, eliminate a director’s personal liability to
the corporation and its shareholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duties, but may not eliminate liability for acts or
182
omissions not in good faith. “Good faith” is expressly defined in the
MBCA as “honesty in fact in the conduct of the act or transaction
183
concerned” such that a director or officer will be deemed to have
acted in good faith in taking an action he or she honestly, although
perhaps not reasonably, believed was in the corporation’s best
interests.
In contrast, although the Delaware statute requires good faith
184
for indemnification of officers and directors and for liability of
directors for monetary damages in certain circumstances to be
185
eliminated in a corporation’s certificate of incorporation, it does
not define good faith—leaving that important concept to
interpretation by the courts.
178. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 1.
179. Id. § 302A.361. Interestingly, the standard of conduct for directors
provides that a director who performs those duties is not liable by reason of being
or having been a director of the corporation, whereas section 302A.361 contains
no comparable provision with respect to officers. The authors presume this is
simply an oversight, and it seems clear that officers who satisfy the statutory
standard, like directors, would not be liable.
180. Id. §§ 302A.251, subd. 1, 302A.361.
181. Id. § 302A.521, subd. 2.
182. Id. § 302A.251, subd. 4 (emphasis added).
183. Id. § 302A.011, subd. 13.
184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001).
185. Id. § 102(b)(7).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

39

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
09GARONSTANCHFIELDMATHESON.DOC

808

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

3.

1/14/2006 5:57:31 PM

[Vol. 32:2

Multiple-Constituency Statute

While both the MBCA and Delaware case law require directors
to act in what they believe are the best interests of the corporation,
only the MBCA clearly defines which corporate constituencies may
be taken into account in making that determination. The MBCA
specifically authorizes directors, in considering the best interests of
the corporation in discharging their duties, to consider the
interests of the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, and
creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and
societal considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, including the
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued
186
independence of the corporation. The Delaware statute provides
187
no guidance in this regard.
4.

Asset Transfers

In addition to codifying directors’ and officers’ duties and
more precisely establishing their protections from liability and
monetary obligations, the MBCA much more clearly provides a
legal roadmap to directors, officers, and shareholders regarding
the permissibility of extraordinary corporate actions such as sales of
188
substantial assets and mergers.
The MBCA provides important
guidance regarding which dispositions of assets can be effected by a
189
Minnesota corporation without a shareholder vote. It specifically
states that no shareholder approval is necessary to transfer assets to
190
a wholly owned subsidiary.
The Delaware legislature finally
186. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 5 (2004).
187. Delaware relies upon case law to guide directors’ considerations about
what is in the best interests of the corporation. The Revlon court interpreted some
earlier statements in Unocal as holding that, except in the context of a sale or
break-up of the company, a board may consider non-shareholder constituencies so
long as there are rationally related benefits to the shareholders in doing so.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985)); see infra Part IV.B.1.c. (discussing the Revlon line of cases).
188. MINN. STAT. §§ 302A.661, 302A.601, subd. 1.
189. Id. § 302A.661, subds. 1, 2.
190. Id. subd. 1. This language is similar to the Model Business Corporation
Act. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.01(3) (2005) (“No approval of the shareholders
of a corporation is required, unless the articles of incorporation otherwise provide:
. . . to transfer any or all of the corporation’s assets to one or more corporations or
other entities all of the shares or interests of which are owned by the
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191

followed suit by adopting a similar provision in 2005, more than
ten years after adoption of the Minnesota statute.
The 2004 amendments to the MBCA provided additional
guidance in determining whether a particular disposition by a
Minnesota corporation of substantial assets to a party, other than a
wholly owned subsidiary, is a disposition “of all or substantially all
of its property and assets . . . not in the usual and regular course of
192
its business” necessitating a shareholder vote.
Those
amendments established a safe harbor for transfers that do not
trigger the voting requirement.
The safe harbor permits
dispositions without a shareholder vote if the corporation “retains a
193
significant continuing business activity.”
A “significant
continuing business activity” is one that represents at least (1) 25%
of the corporation’s consolidated total assets at the end of the most
recently completed fiscal year and (2) 25% of either consolidated
income from continuing operations before taxes or consolidated
194
revenues from continuing operations for that fiscal year.
Delaware corporations are not beneficiaries of such a clear test.
Instead, what constitutes “all or substantially all” of a Delaware
corporation’s assets is again left to the courts to interpret on a case195
by-case basis.
5.

Business Purpose for Mergers

At the time the MBCA was enacted, the Delaware courts were
struggling to determine whether a merger that eliminated minority
shareholders who did not vote for the merger should be
permissible even if there was no valid “business purpose” for the
196
merger. The MBCA expressly eliminated this area of uncertainty
by providing that two or more corporations may merge “with or

corporation.”).
191. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(c) (2001 & Supp. 2005) (amended by 75
Del. Laws ch. 30 (2005)).
192. MINN. STAT. § 302A.661, subd. 2(a).
193. Id. subd. 2(b).
194. Id.
195. See Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l, Inc., 858 A.2d 342, 385 (Del. Ch.
2004) (“Although by no means wholly consistent, [section 271] case law has, by
and large, refused to find that a disposition involved substantially all of the assets
of a corporation when the assets that would remain after the sale were, in
themselves, substantial and profitable.”). See infra Part IV.B.2.
196. See infra Part IV.B.1.e.
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without a business purpose” upon receiving the requisite board
197
The Delaware courts flipapproval and shareholder vote.
flopped, at first requiring a business purpose and then holding that
198
a business purpose is not required for a parent-subsidiary merger.
6.

Revaluation of Surplus for Dividend, Stock-Repurchase Purposes

Another basic area of corporate law relates to the permissibility
of distributions of cash or other property to shareholders in
establishing the relative rights of creditors, preferred shareholders,
and holders of common stock. Limitations on dividends and stock
repurchases based on a corporation’s net assets arise under the
199
MBCA only if the corporation has outstanding preferred stock.
In that event, the dividend or repurchase is permitted only if all
amounts payable to shareholders having a preference for that kind
of distribution are made and the payment on the junior stock does
not reduce the remaining net assets of the corporation below the
aggregate preferential amount payable in the event of liquidation
200
to the holders of preferred stock.
The statute specifically
provides that the determination of the “net assets” remaining after
the distribution can be made “on the basis of financial information
prepared in accordance with accounting methods, or a fair
201
valuation, or other methods, reasonable in the circumstances.”
As stated in the Reporter’s Notes, this provision:
authorizes departures from historical cost accounting and
sanctions the utilization of appraisal methods for the
purpose of determining the fund available for
distributions. . . . In most cases, a fair valuation method
on a going concern basis would likely be appropriate, if
expectations are that the enterprise will continue as a
202
viable going concern.
For Delaware corporations, the issue of how “net assets” should
be valued for purposes of the “surplus” test is much more
important than for Minnesota corporations because the existence

197. MINN. STAT. § 302A.601, subd. 1.
198. See infra Part IV.B.1.e.
199. MINN. STAT. § 302A.551, subd. 4.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.551 (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes, 1981,
General Comment).
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of sufficient “net assets” in excess of “capital” (i.e., surplus) is
necessary for a Delaware corporation to declare and pay dividends
(except to the extent it has or had net profits for the current or
immediately preceding year) or repurchase stock, even if the
203
corporation has no outstanding preferred stock.
Nevertheless,
there is nothing in the Delaware statute that specifically authorizes
the revaluation of assets to their fair market value on a goingconcern basis or otherwise, thereby creating some uncertainty as to
the flexibility available to the board of directors to determine “net
asset” value. Although the Delaware courts have attempted to fill
204
this void, the Delaware legislature could have saved practitioners
a substantial amount of anguish in this fundamental area had it
followed the approach taken in the MBCA.
7.

Stock Split Without a Shareholder Vote

Nothing contained in most corporate statutes would preclude
a corporation from granting a pro rata stock dividend payable in
shares of a corporation’s stock to holders of shares of that class of
stock, presuming, of course, the corporation has sufficient
authorized but unissued shares of that class of stock under its
205
charter to issue the dividend.
Unlike other dividends, these
involve no transfer of cash or other property constituting corporate
assets from the corporation to its shareholders.
A more uncertain issue under the corporate law of most states,
including Delaware, is whether a board can unilaterally divide
outstanding shares of a class of stock into more shares (i.e., a
203. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170 (2001) (providing a dividend may be paid
to shareholders out of “either (1) a surplus, as defined and computed in
accordance with §§ 154 and 244,” or (2) “net profits for the fiscal year in which the
dividend is declared and/or the preceding fiscal year”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
160(a)(1) (providing that a corporation may not repurchase its own shares if the
repurchase would impair the capital of the corporation).
204. See, e.g., Klang v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 154 (Del.
1997) (permitting a board of directors to revalue assets in the stock-repurchase
context); Morris v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 63 A.2d 577, 585 (Del. Ch. 1949)
(holding that boards of directors have some flexibility in revaluing assets to their
fair market value for the purpose of determining the validity of dividends).
205. Minnesota Statutes section 302A.405, subdivision 1(b), provides, however,
that a dividend of shares of a class or series of stock to holders of another class or
series of stock is not permitted unless expressly provided for in the corporation’s
articles of incorporation or approved by the holders of a majority of the voting
power of all shares of the class or series the shares of which would be issued as
dividends.
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forward stock split) or unilaterally combine outstanding shares of a
class of stock into fewer shares (i.e., a reverse stock split) on a pro
rata basis. In most states, shares with par value cannot be divided
into more, or combined into fewer, shares with a greater or lesser
par value per share because changing per-share par value
necessitates an amendment to the corporate charter, which
requires a shareholder vote. This does not necessarily resolve the
issue of whether all forward or reverse stock splits require a
shareholder vote because the shares being split might not have par
value and shares with par value arguably could be split or
206
combined without splitting or combining par value per share.
The MBCA resolves these uncertainties. It not only specifically
authorizes the board of directors to issue stock dividends without a
207
shareholder vote,
but also permits a board of directors to
unilaterally authorize share divisions or combinations without a
208
shareholder vote, subject to certain exceptions.
The statute also
specifically permits the board, as part of a unilateral stock split, to
unilaterally amend the articles of incorporation without a
shareholder vote to increase or decrease the number of authorized
shares, to increase or decrease par value, and to “make any other
change necessary or appropriate to assure that the rights or
preferences of the holders of outstanding shares of any class or
series will not be adversely affected by the division or
209
combination.”
Allowing such unilateral board amendments to
206. For example, a two-for-one stock split arguably could double the number
of outstanding shares and the aggregate par value of all outstanding shares
without changing par value per share.
207. MINN. STAT. § 302A.402, subd. 3(a) (2004).
208. Id. Such unilateral “splitting” cannot be effected if the rights or
preferences of the holders of outstanding shares of any class or series will be
adversely affected. Id. subd. 2(a). An increase or decrease in the relative voting
rights of the shares being split or combined arising solely from the increase or
decrease in the number of shares outstanding is deemed not to constitute an
adverse effect on the outstanding shares of any class or series, however. Id. subd.
4. In addition, the MBCA specifically requires shareholder approval for stock
splits if the percentage of authorized shares of any class or series remaining
unissued after the split will exceed the percentage of authorized shares of that
class or series that were unissued before the split (which would be the case in the
event of a reverse stock split if the number of authorized shares is not
proportionately reduced). Id. subd. 2(a). As a result, a corporation with 10,000
authorized shares of which 5000 shares are outstanding could effect a one-for-five
reverse stock split without a shareholder vote only if it simultaneously reduces its
authorized shares from 10,000 to 2000.
209. Id. subd. 3(a).
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increase the number of authorized shares permits a board to effect
a stock split even if the corporation does not, prior to the unilateral
amendment, have sufficient authorized but unissued shares to
effect a stock split or to issue a stock dividend.
8.

Broker Non-Votes

In addition to providing statutory guidance in the areas of
director and officer conduct and protection from liability,
extraordinary transactions such as mergers and sales of substantial
assets, and distributions to shareholders, the MBCA provides
precision in determining the requirements for shareholder voting.
The MBCA generally permits shareholder action by holders of a
“majority of the voting power of the shares present and entitled to
vote on that item of business” or such larger proportion or number
set forth in the MBCA or the corporation’s articles of
210
incorporation.
Similarly, in the absence of a provision in the
certificate of incorporation or bylaws to the contrary, the
affirmative majority vote of the shares of a Delaware corporation
present in person or represented by proxy and entitled to vote on
211
the subject matter generally is required for shareholder action.
In Delaware, there is no statutory provision determining
whether a so-called “broker non-vote”⎯a written proxy granting a
person the right to vote the shares of a shareholder on certain
matters but withholding from the person the power to vote the
shareholder’s shares on other matters⎯causes the grantor’s shares
210. MINN. STAT. § 302A.437, subd. 1. The exact statutory requirement is:
the shareholders shall take action by the affirmative vote of the holders of
the greater of (1) a majority of the voting power of the shares present
and entitled to vote on that item of business, or (2) a majority of the
voting power of the minimum number of the shares entitled to vote that
would constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at the meeting,
except where [the MBCA] or the articles require a larger proportion or
number.
Id. In most contexts, clause (2) of the requirement does not come into play.
211. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2001). Both Minnesota and Delaware
provide that directors are elected by a plurality vote. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216;
MINN. STAT. § 302A.215, subd. 1. The statutes of both states provide for a higher
approval threshold—a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote—for
certain extraordinary corporate actions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c)
(mergers) (2001 & Supp. 2004); MINN. STAT. § 302A.613, subd. 2. But see DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (majority of outstanding shares required for such an
amendment); MINN. STAT. § 302A.135, subd. 2 (no higher voting threshold for
amendment of corporate charter).
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to be represented by proxy and entitled to vote on the matters with
respect to which the person holding the proxy had no authority to
212
vote. The MBCA, on the other hand, specifically provides that if
a proxy is given authority by a shareholder to vote on less than all
items of business, the shareholder is considered to be present and
entitled to vote by proxy, for purposes of the majority-vote
requirement, only with respect to those items of business for which
213
Minnesota has therefore clearly
the proxy has authority to vote.
provided in its corporate statute that shares subject to a broker
non-vote on an item of business are not present and entitled to vote
on that item of business (i.e., are not included in the denominator
for purposes of determining whether holders of a majority of the
voting power of the shares present and entitled to vote has
approved that item of business) even though the broker has voted
on a discretionary basis on other items of business such as the
214
uncontested election of directors.
Once again, Delaware’s
215
legislature left that decision to the courts.
9.

Shareholder Action in Lieu of Board of Directors

In many closely held corporations, including wholly owned
subsidiaries, the ability of holders of all the corporation’s voting
shares to take an action that the state corporate statute reserves to
the board of directors remains uncertain. Nothing in the Delaware
212. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(c). Section 212(c) does not limit the
manner in which a shareholder may authorize another person or persons to act
for the shareholder as proxy, and section 216 sets the default quorum standard as
the majority of shares entitled to vote, present or in person by proxy, without
describing the effect of a proxy that is limited to votes on certain proposals
occurring at the meeting. Broker non-votes arise from rules that prohibit brokerdealers holding shares in “street name” from voting on certain “non-routine”
proposals absent voting instructions from the beneficial owner. E.g., NYSE Rule
452, http://rules.nyse.com/nysetools/Exchangeviewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1
_1&manual=/nyse/nyse_rules/nyse-rules/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2005).
213. MINN. STAT. § 302A.449, subd. 8.
214. As a result, a shareholder action of a Minnesota corporation with 1000
outstanding shares of which 400 are voted in favor of the item, 200 are voted
against it, and 300 are broker non-votes, will be deemed to have passed if a
majority vote of shares present and entitled to vote are needed to approve it.
215. See Berlin v. Emerald Partners, 552 A.2d 482, 491-94 (Del. 1989)
(reaching a result similar to what the MBCA expressly provides: shares represented
by a limited proxy are deemed present for quorum purposes, but are not deemed
present and entitled to vote with respect to proposals for which the proxy has no
authority to vote).
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statute specifically authorizes such a shareholder action.
Under
the MBCA, however, the holders of all shares entitled to vote for
directors may unanimously take any action in lieu of the board of
217
directors.
This flexibility is especially useful for wholly owned
subsidiaries where it might be impracticable to quickly locate all of
the subsidiary’s directors (who are often senior executives of the
parent corporation) but relatively easy to locate an authorized
officer of the parent corporation who can approve the action in
lieu of the subsidiary board. In addition, the MBCA specifically
authorizes all shareholders and subscribers to enter into written
agreements with the corporation concerning the control of any
phase of the business and affairs of the corporation, its liquidation
and dissolution, and relations among shareholders and
218
subscribers.
Such a shareholder control agreement may
supersede, to the extent provided in the agreement, the rights of
219
the board to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.
10. Elimination of Fractional Shares
In addition to eliminating minority shareholders through
merger, a process which led to a reversal of the Delaware courts’
position concerning whether a merger needed to have a business
220
purpose,
corporations may desire to eliminate smaller
shareholders without their consent through a reverse stock split in
which shares of each such shareholder become a single fractional
share, which is then cashed out without the shareholder’s consent.
For instance, if a corporation has numerous shareholders holding
less than 100 shares, it could effect a 1-for-100 reverse stock split,
cash out each fractional share, and thereby eliminate all
shareholders who previously held less than 100 shares. This
216. If the corporation elects in its certificate of incorporation to be a close
corporation subject to subchapter XIV of the Delaware statute, however, the
corporation may then also provide in its certificate of incorporation that the
corporation will be managed by the shareholders rather than by a board of
directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 351.
217. MINN. STAT. § 302A.201, subd. 2.
218. MINN. STAT. § 302A.457. Shareholders of a Delaware corporation electing
in its certificate of incorporation to be a close corporation may, by written
agreement of a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote, restrict the
powers of the board of directors in the conduct of the business and affairs of the
corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350.
219. MINN. STAT. § 302A.201, subd. 1.
220. See supra Part IV.A.5.
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process is potentially more disadvantageous to the smaller
shareholders than a “freeze-out” merger because no dissenters’
221
rights are available.
In most states, including Delaware, the
extent to which such a reverse stock split may be used to eliminate
222
The MBCA codifies the limitations
shareholders is uncertain.
upon freeze-outs of minority shareholders through a reverse stock
split, providing a bright-line test for determining the validity of the
action. It states that a corporation may not pay money for
fractional shares if that action would result in cancellation of more
223
than 20% of the outstanding shares of a class or series.
B. Precedential (Un)Predictability of Delaware Corporate Law
As the previous section demonstrates, substantially more
corporate legal issues can be resolved within the four corners of the
MBCA and similar statutes than within the four corners of the
Delaware statute. However, increased codification of a state’s
corporate laws does not necessarily establish the superiority of
those laws. Proponents of the Delaware statute argue that leaving
most corporate law matters to the courts rather than codifying
them increases the flexibility of the Delaware statute and fosters an
224
evolving corporate law.
221. See supra Part III.E.
222. In Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., the shareholders authorized the board to
effect one of three alternative reverse stock splits (1-for-30, 1-for-40, or 1-for-50) to
eliminate shareholders that would own less than one share after the split. 812
A.2d 880, 883 (Del. 2002). The primary purpose was to eliminate millions of very
small public shareholders to save very substantial printing and mailing costs. Id. at
883. The court upheld the split even though it did not eliminate fractional shares
of those who would own more than one share after the reverse stock split. Id. at
886-87. It did not resolve the issue, however, of whether the court would have
permitted a reverse split that would have eliminated very substantial shareholders
in such numbers as would have enabled the corporation to cease being a public
corporation. See id.
223. MINN. STAT. § 302A.423, subd. 2. As the Reporter’s Notes state: “This
prohibition protects shareholders against excessive abuse of the power granted by
subdivision 1(b) [to cash-out fractional shares] where many or most of the shares
are fractional interests due to an unusual ration [sic] of exchange, or where the
price of one share is unusually high or where controlling interests have issued only
fractional shares.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.423 (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes,
1981, General Comment (c)).
224. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition
for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2000) (describing “the unique
law making function of the Delaware courts” as an explanation for Delaware’s
success in attracting corporations); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di
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The purported increase in flexibility comes at a price: a lack of
predictability for corporations attempting to comply with Delaware
law. This is particularly the case because of the tendency of the
Delaware courts to reverse (or at least significantly alter) course,
the frequent unexplained and unacknowledged inconsistencies in
225
court decisions, and ambiguities in certain major decisions.
Despite the vast number of corporate law decisions in Delaware, it
is notable that many aspects of corporate law that are codified in
the MBCA and other state corporate statutes have never been dealt
with definitively by the Delaware courts or were clarified many years
after practitioners tried to glean the meaning from the Delaware
226
statute.
As was stated more than ten years ago in an article
regarding then-recent decisions involving fiduciary duties of
directors of Delaware corporations:
[P]redicting developments in Delaware law has always
been a somewhat foolish enterprise. Many learned
commentators have written careful and lucid analyses
predicting the trend of Delaware case law, only to have
doctrinal prognostications shattered by the next big case.
Predicting the course of Delaware law from prior case law
is like watching clouds. They seem, at times, to take on
recognizable shapes and forms, even to resemble
something familiar. But you know that whatever shapes
227
you think you see can vanish in a puff of wind.
The last decade of Delaware court decisions has not discredited this
228
apt analogy.
Some assert that more extensive case law, such as in Delaware,
may create greater predictability and certainty in the law, which
Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance From 19922004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1412-13
(2005) (praising Delaware’s flexible, indeterminate system over more codified
models of corporate law).
225. See Veasey & DiGuglielmo, supra note 224, at 1404.
226. E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for Judicial Decisionmaking in
Corporate Law, 53 BUS. LAW. 681, 696-700 (1998). Norman Veasey, the Chief Justice
of the Delaware Supreme Court from 1992 to 2004, noted the difficulty of creating
a legal system that is both predictable and evolving in stating: “Case law should be
reasonably stable, predictable, and dynamic. It is obvious . . . that there is a tension
between dynamism and stability in the development of the case law.” Id. at 688-89.
227. Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Law
After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49
BUS. LAW. 1593, 1626 (1994).
228. See infra Part IV.B.1-3.
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may be a very important reason for preferring Delaware as the state
229
While the high number of Delaware
for incorporation.
corporations plays a role in Delaware’s extensive case law, the
abundance of case law can also be attributed to the uncertainty of
Delaware law, with its limited codification and frequently changing
nature, which does not give potential litigants sufficient
precedential guidance to resolve their differences without resorting
to litigation. Examples of such inconsistencies and unpredictability
abound in Delaware case law; the following are specific examples in
key areas.
1. Directors’ Fiduciary Duties and Liabilities
a.

General

One of the most basic aspects of corporate law is providing
guidance regarding a director’s fiduciary duties. Because those
duties are not spelled out in the Delaware statute, it is necessary to
decipher them based on an examination of a number of Delaware
cases. This effort is made more difficult because of the uncertain
relationship between the duties of a director of a Delaware
corporation and the liability of a director who does not satisfy those
duties. As three current and former judges of the Delaware Court
of Chancery noted in their seminal article in the area, “[t]here
exists a close, but not perfect, relationship, between the standard by
which [Delaware] courts measure director liability (the ‘standard of
review’) and the standard of behavior that we normatively expect of
230
directors (the ‘standard of conduct’).”
A review of the case law suggests that the standard of conduct
in Delaware may be comparable to the statutory standard of
conduct under the MBCA.
Under Delaware law, directors

229. Commentators and practitioners frequently equate the amount of case
law in Delaware with clear delineation of the law as a result of the quantity of
cases. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354
(1992) (“Corporate lawyers across the United States have praised the expertise of
the [Delaware] Court of Chancery, noting that since the turn of the century, it has
handed down thousands of opinions interpreting virtually every provision of
Delaware’s corporate law statute. No other state court can make such a claim.”).
230. William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1295 (2001).
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apparently have the duty to act in good faith, in a manner the
directors “honestly” believe to be in the best interests of the
231
corporation, and with due care.
If that is the standard, it
arguably, at least on its face, would be a lesser standard because the
Minnesota statute requires that the directors act in a manner that
they reasonably, rather than honestly, believe is in the
232
corporation’s best interests.
Otherwise, the standards are
consistent in that they include a duty of loyalty (i.e., to act in what
the directors believe to be the best interests of the corporation), a
duty of care, and a “good faith” requirement.
The Delaware courts, however, have expanded on these duties
or, perhaps more accurately, divided them into sub-duties to fit
certain fact situations. For instance, in the Caremark case, the court
established a “duty of oversight” within the duty of care, which
requires directors “to attempt in good faith to assure that a
corporate information and reporting system, which the board
231. This is actually the standard under the “business judgment rule”⎯a
standard of review, not a standard of conduct. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984) (setting forth the elements of the business judgment rule). With
regard to the general duties of care and loyalty, the Delaware courts have seemed
to use standards of conduct and standards of review interchangeably. See, e.g., In re
NCS Healthcare, Inc. S’holders Litig., 825 A.2d 240, 257 (Del. Ch. 2002), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del.
2003) (“The applicable standard of conduct when deciding whether directors have
properly exercised their duty of care is whether they acted with ‘gross negligence,’
and whether they were adequately informed at the time they made their decision.
This is the business judgment standard of review.”) (emphasis added, footnote
omitted).
232. The authors believe, however, that the standards of conduct and liability
in Minnesota and Delaware are probably similar. Presumably, the duty of
directors in Minnesota and Delaware is to act reasonably but the standard of
review (or avoidance of liability) is a lesser standard⎯that the directors were not
grossly negligent or, put another way, that they acted rationally or within a range
of reasonableness. Despite Minnesota Statutes section 302A.251, which states that
a director performing his or her statutory “duties” is not liable by reason of being
or having been a director of the corporation, the authors believe the provision to
be a safe harbor and that a director exercising “rational” business judgment would
not be liable despite failing to act in what he or she “reasonably” believed to be in
the best interests of the corporation as long as the director “honestly” believed his
or her conduct was in the corporation’s best interests. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan,
662 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 2003) (citing DENNIS J. BLOCK, ET AL., THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 18 (5th ed. 1998))
(“The business judgment rule means that as long as the disinterested director(s)
made an informed business decision, in good faith, without an abuse of discretion,
he or she will not be liable for corporate losses resulting from his or her
decision.”).
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concludes is adequate, exists” that is “reasonably designed to
provide to senior management and to the board itself timely,
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the
board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments
concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law and its
233
business performance.”
In Revlon and successor cases in the
merger context, discussed in more detail below, the courts
established that a board of directors, when approving the sale of
the corporation, must act reasonably to obtain the best price it can
234
reasonably obtain in the sale. Moreover, in Unocal, the Delaware
Supreme Court required that when a board considers defensive
tactics in the face of a corporate takeover attempt, it has a duty,
before adopting those tactics, to determine that, if the takeover
succeeds, a reasonable threat exists to corporate policies and
effectiveness: it must then take only actions that are not draconian
235
and are reasonably proportionate responses to the threat.
The standard of conduct for directors of Delaware
corporations established through case law generally has not caused
major problems for practitioners or directors. The basic standard
is similar to that set forth in the MBCA, and the subcategories of
duties of oversight and duties in connection with the adoption of
defensive takeover tactics have been well established. Courts have
236
consistently followed the seminal cases: Caremark and Unocal. It is
likely that those same subcategories of duties would be presumed
by Minnesota attorneys to be imposed in oversight and defensive
tactic cases pursuant to the general standard of conduct in the
MBCA. The Revlon line of cases, on the other hand, shows the
fallacy of creating a standard of conduct one case at a time in the
context of sales of corporate control.
233. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch.
1996).
234. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184
(Del. 1986); see discussion infra Part IV.B.1.c. Revlon suggests that the general duty
may be, like Minnesota’s, to act in a manner the director reasonably, rather than
honestly, believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.
235. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
The second prong of the two-prong Unocal test was clarified in Unitrin, Inc. v.
American General Corp., which held that a defensive measure is “draconian” if it is
either “preclusive” or “coercive” and that a non-draconian defensive measure must
only fall within a “range of reasonableness” to withstand scrutiny under Unocal.
651 A.2d 1361, 1387-89 (Del. 1995).
236. See Revlon, 506 A.2d 173; Unocal, 493 A.2d 946; Caremark, 698 A.2d 959.
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The primary problem with the Delaware cases, other than the
Revlon line of cases, relates not to the standard of conduct for
directors but rather to the liability of directors who do not satisfy
the standard of conduct. To try to make logical sense of the
Delaware law relating to directors’ liability, it is necessary to address
three separate but interrelated areas: (1) determination of the
initial liability of directors who fail to satisfy the Delaware standard
of conduct, (2) the exculpation from monetary liability of directors
under charter provisions authorized by the Delaware statutes, and
(3) indemnification by the corporation with respect to acts of
directors for which they are found to have been liable.
b.

Van Gorkom to Disney—Directors’ Personal Liability

The three areas referred to above—director liability,
exculpation, and indemnification—have gone through a number
of changes from 1985 to the present. Their interrelated nature has
meant that a change to one area often had potentially unintended
consequences in another area.
Until the 1980s, directors were rarely found to be liable for
breaching their duty of care, and liability was imposed almost
exclusively in situations in which directors were found to have acted
237
in their personal interest, thereby breaching their duty of loyalty.
Directors were saved from liability under the so-called “business
judgment rule,” which is a judicial presumption that the directors
acted in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the honest belief
238
that their actions were in the best interests of the corporation.
Indeed, it is virtually impossible to find a Delaware case before 1985
in which a director who did not act in self-interest was found to be
liable, and practitioners prior to that time generally assumed that
directors who were not acting in their self-interest would not be
found liable for a breach of the judicially created standard of
conduct unless their conduct could not be justified on any rational
239
basis.
Contrary to these widely held beliefs, in the 1985 Smith v. Van
Gorkom decision—a case so well known that its facts need not be
237. Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 227, at 1597.
238. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The Delaware courts
place the burden on the plaintiffs to rebut the presumptions of the business
judgment rule. Id.
239. See Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 227, at 1597.
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discussed in detail—the Delaware Supreme Court imposed liability
on directors whom it found to have been grossly negligent in
approving a merger without an independent valuation of an
investment banker, adequate deliberation, or adequate exceptions
to the deal-protection provisions in the merger agreement in a
situation in which it concluded that the sale process was dominated
240
by the company’s chief executive officer.
This decision was
reached despite the fact that the sale was at a substantial premium
to market price and that the directors were all leading businessmen
or academics who had a high degree of familiarity with the
241
If those directors were in fact grossly negligent, the
company.
general view among practitioners was that “gross negligence” was
being re-defined by the courts to be more akin to simple
242
“negligence.” Without changing the wording of the standard for
liability, the courts, to most practitioners and their clients, had
243
changed the actual standard without any warning.
In reaction to widespread concerns about the Delaware
Supreme Court’s departure in Van Gorkom from its previous
application of its standard of review of actions of disinterested
directors, the Delaware legislature enacted section 102(b)(7) of the
244
Delaware statute.
The new legislation allowed a corporation to

240. 488 A.2d 858, 874, 876-77, 880-81 (Del. 1985).
241. Id. at 894, 896 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
242. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance
Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1160 (1990) (“[M]ost practitioners, like the lower court,
would have predicted that the facts in Van Gorkom would not constitute gross
negligence under Delaware’s duty of care standard.”).
243. See E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59
BUS. LAW. 1447, 1447 (2004) (“The watershed year of 1985, featuring Smith v.
VanGorkom [and other notable cases] was indeed a time when many of the rules of
the road did change . . . .”). The change wrought by Van Gorkom became even
more significant a few years later as a result of the equally surprising decision in
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). In that case the court
found that the directors were “grossly negligent” in approving a merger because of
a deficient process, thereby losing the benefit of the presumptions under the
business judgment rule. Id. at 366-67. The consequence of that determination
was that the court applied the exacting “entire fairness” standard of review,
requiring the directors to prove that the challenged transaction was fair to
shareholders as to process and result. Id. at 370-72. This blending of the entire
fairness standard of review, which had previously been reserved for situations in
which directors had a conflict of interest, with the gross-negligence standard for
disinterested directors was unique and unanticipated by most Delaware
practitioners. Allen et al., supra note 230, at 1302.
244. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
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adopt a charter provision eliminating the liability of its directors for
monetary liability to the corporation and its shareholders for all
breaches of fiduciary duty other than (1) the duty of loyalty; (2)
acts or omissions not in good faith, or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; or (3) any transaction
245
from which the directors derived an improper personal benefit.
The urgency the legislature felt to ensure that Delaware
corporations could attract and retain qualified directors after Van
Gorkom is reflected in the enactment of section 102(b)(7), which
allows corporations to eliminate directors’ monetary liability for
breaches of fiduciary duties that are not defined in the Delaware
246
statute.
Prior to the August 2005 post-trial decision of the Delaware
247
Court of Chancery in The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, the
Delaware courts clearly broadened directors’ exposure to liability
in recent decisions, apparently without regard to the legislature’s
concern about the ability of Delaware corporations to attract and
retain directors. For example, in In re Emerging Communications, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation, the Court of Chancery found certain outside
directors, but not others, liable for breaching their fiduciary duties
248
in an acquisition transaction.
Although one of the directors, a
lawyer, was found liable on duty-of-loyalty grounds because of his
professional relationship with the controlling shareholder, liability
was also imposed on a professional investment adviser who had no
personal financial interest in the transaction itself on the theory
that his “specialized financial expertise” put him “in a unique
position” to “[know] (or at least having very strong reasons to
suspect)” that the transaction price was unfair to the other
249
shareholders of the corporation.
The defendant director with
that expertise also had received substantial sums professionally
250
from the controlling shareholder, and liability might not have
resulted if there was no such relationship. Nevertheless, the fact
245. Section 102(b)(7) also does not eliminate liability under section 174,
which holds directors jointly and severally liable for paying unlawful dividends or
for an unlawful stock purchase or redemption. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174.
246. Id. § 102(b)(7).
247. No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
248. No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004, revised June 4,
2004).
249. Id. at *39-40.
250. Id. at *34.
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that the court focused on the director’s unique expertise and did
not find other outside directors liable despite their relationships
251
with the controlling shareholder suggested that the Delaware
courts were moving even farther away from a true “gross
negligence” standard of review for alleged breaches of the duty of
care.
The movement of the Delaware courts toward a negligence test
for determining a director’s liability following Van Gorkom was not
particularly surprising because it was presaged by Van Gorkom. On
the other hand, the courts’ undercutting of the Delaware
exculpation statute designed to protect directors from the Van
Gorkom decision in the event directors were found to have breached
their duty of care was very troubling and demonstrated the
problematic interpretation of the statute by the courts.
The exculpation provisions of the Delaware statute were
designed to allow corporations to protect directors absolutely from
personal monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care, even if
the directors were grossly negligent, and to enable directors to
252
obtain dismissal of legal actions against them at a very early stage.
The statutory exceptions to the exculpation protection were
intended only to ensure that directors acting in their self-interest or
in a manner that they themselves believed was not in the best
253
interests of the corporation could not escape liability.
The
Minnesota statute, which is virtually identical to the Delaware
statute, achieves that result even though it also does not protect the
254
director who fails to act in good faith.
251. The court held that the remaining directors were not liable for fiduciary
violations aside from breaches of the duty of care. Id. at *41. For one director in
particular, this holding seems incongruent with the finding against the director
with financial expertise. This director had a consulting agreement with the
controlling shareholder that represented on average 22.5% of his income for
three consecutive years, and the controlling shareholder also had a consulting
agreement with the director’s son-in-law. Id. at *34. All of the directors who were
not found personally liable for breaches of fiduciary duties were also paid high
compensation for their board positions, and expected to continue as directors of a
related entity after the transaction was completed. Id. at *35.
252. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095 (Del. 2001).
253. See R. Franklin Balotti & Mark J. Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of
Director Liability for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 17-18 (1987)
(“Absent such ‘interest,’ however, a director should be able to rely on traditional
concepts of the fiduciary duty of care in looking to section 102(b)(7) for
protection from monetary damages.”).
254. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 4 (2004).
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Because the Delaware statute requires, but contains no
255
the Delaware courts needed to
definition of, “good faith,”
formulate a judicial definition. Unfortunately, however, that
definition evolved in cases decided prior to the 2005 Chancery
Court decision in Disney into one that undercut what most directors
and practitioners believed was the clear intent of the statute. In the
2003 Disney decision, in which the court refused a pre-trial motion
to dismiss the claims against the Disney directors for their action
and inaction in connection with the employment and severance of
256
Disney’s president, Michael Ovitz, the plaintiffs claimed that the
directors failed to exercise due care in approving Ovitz’s lucrative
257
employment contract, including a generous severance package.
The court stated:
Knowing or deliberate indifference by a director to his or
her duty to act faithfully and with appropriate care is
conduct, in my opinion, that may not have been taken
honestly and in good faith to advance the best interests of
the company. Put differently, all of the alleged facts, if
true, imply that the defendant directors knew that they
were making material decisions without adequate
information and without adequate deliberation, and that
they simply did not care if the decisions caused the
corporation and its stockholders to suffer injury or loss.
Viewed in this light, plaintiffs’ new complaint sufficiently
alleges a breach of the directors’ obligation to act honestly
and in good faith in the corporation’s best interests for a
Court to conclude, if the facts are true, that the defendant
directors’ conduct fell outside the protection of the
258
business judgment rule.
Because of this determination, the court refused to dismiss the
complaint, despite the fact that the plaintiffs did not question the
loyalty of the Disney directors, stating:
A fair reading of the new complaint, in my opinion, gives
rise to a reason to doubt whether the board’s actions were
taken honestly and in good faith. . . . Since acts or
255. In contrast, the MBCA from the date of its enactment statutorily defined
“good faith” as “honesty in fact in the conduct of the act or transaction
concerned.” Id. § 302A.011, subd. 13.
256. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch.
2003).
257. Id. at 278.
258. Id. at 289 (emphasis in original).
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omissions not undertaken honestly and in good faith . . .
do not fall within the protective ambit of § 102(b)(7), I
cannot dismiss the complaint based on the exculpatory
259
Disney charter provision.
It was possible for the court to conclude that under the facts
alleged by the Disney plaintiffs prior to trial, the directors “knew”
they were making material decisions without adequate information
260
It is questionable, however,
and without adequate deliberation.
how the court could suggest that under those alleged facts the
directors “did not care if the decisions caused the corporation and
261
its stockholders to suffer injury or loss.”
The character of this
pre-trial decision suggests that the court was reacting to the Enron,
Tyco, Adelphia, and other high-profile corporate abuses that were
262
recently brought to light in the Sarbanes-Oxley era.
What followed from the pre-trial Disney decision was one of the
longest and most expensive trials in the history of the Court of
263
Chancery. The court’s post-trial opinion struggled with the “hazy
264
regarding what constitutes good faith for
jurisprudence”
purposes of the Delaware statute, determining that it would be
265
easier to define “bad faith” rather than good faith.
Continuing
the approach it had begun in the pre-trial decision quoted above,
the court created a non-exclusive definition of bad faith as
“intentional dereliction of duty, [and] a conscious disregard for
266
one’s responsibilities.”
Again, without excluding other
possibilities, the court described “[d]eliberate indifference and

259. Id. at 286.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 289.
262. See Veasey, supra note 243, at 1453 (“[B]oards should be told that it is
arguable . . . that their conduct may be measured not only by the evolving
expectations of directors in the context of Delaware common law fiduciary duty,
but also it may well be measured against the backdrop of relevant Sarbanes-Oxley
SEC Rules.”).
263. The trial lasted thirty-seven days, generated over 9000 pages of transcript
from twenty-four witnesses, and resulted in a 174-page opinion (with 591
footnotes) by Chancellor Chandler. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No.
Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL 2056651, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
264. Id. at *35.
265. Id.
266. Id. at *36. Leaving the door open for future judicial refinement of the
definition, the court noted “[t]o create a definitive and categorical definition of
the universe of acts that would constitute bad faith would be difficult, if not
impossible.” Id.
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inaction in the face of a duty to act” as “the epitome of faithless
267
conduct.”
Although directors in other corporations may take some
comfort from the fact that the court ultimately found no liability
for any of the directors—even Disney CEO Michael Eisner, whom
268
the court characterized as the “most culpable of the defendants”
in a “painfully detailed” story of “conduct that fell significantly
269
short of the best practices of ideal corporate governance”— one
cannot be certain of a similar outcome in a future case decided by a
different judge or on appeal. Moreover, directors of other
corporations should be sure to note that the Disney directors’
victory was Pyrrhic—imposing significant reputational and financial
costs.
The 2005 Disney decision seems to be in some respects
consistent, and in other respects inconsistent, with recent Delaware
court decisions. Like the 2003 pre-trial decision, it establishes that
there can be a lack of good faith in certain egregious circumstances
by directors who are indifferent to their duties, even though they
do not intentionally act contrary to the best interests of the
corporation. On the other hand, the court went to great lengths to
distinguish ordinary negligence from actionable gross negligence
or bad faith and to establish, based upon its analysis of the facts,
that the threshold for a finding of actionable gross negligence or
bad faith would be very high—higher than many would have
270
anticipated following the 2003 pre-trial decision.
The plaintiffs in the Disney case have appealed the decision. If
the Chancery Court’s definition of “good faith” survives appeal, it is
clear that a director found to have acted in “conscious disregard” of
his or her responsibilities without intentionally acting contrary to
the best interests of the corporation also would not be entitled to
indemnification, which is not permissible unless the director acted
271
in good faith.
The director’s only protection from personal
financial exposure in such a situation would be directors’ and
officers’ liability insurance. The authors believe that the result in
the Disney decisions could not have been predicted under a plain
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id.
Id. at *39.
Id. at *1.
See id. at *39-47.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001).
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reading of the Delaware exculpation statute or by those with an
understanding of the legislative history of the statute. The statute’s
imprecision gave the courts the opportunity to narrow its
application.
c.

Revlon and its Progeny—The Waters Get Murkier

The Revlon decision and the numerous Delaware court
decisions that followed, interpreted, and modified it have created a
patchwork quilt that continues to present surprises for Delaware
corporations and corporate practitioners in the context of sales of
corporations. The surprises stem in part from the fact that
272
Delaware, unlike Minnesota, has no statute setting forth whether
directors of a Delaware corporation may consider the short-term
and the long-term interests of shareholders and the interests of
constituencies other than shareholders, when determining whether
to sell the corporation or take other corporate actions.
Revlon established that once a board of directors has
determined to sell a corporation, it has a court-imposed duty to
attempt to get the best price it reasonably can for its shareholders
273
from the sale of the corporation.
Obtaining maximum
shareholder value in a sale situation does not seem surprising.
Indeed, the question arises why that obligation is not simply
covered by the general duty to act with due care and in the best
interests of the corporation. What Revlon appears to have added to
those general fiduciary duties, however, is a resolution of the
question of which constituencies the board of a Delaware
corporation may consider in the sale context. The Revlon court
categorically established that once the directors have determined
to sell the corporation, their duty is to the shareholders only, not to
other constituencies, and not even if serving the interests of those
other constituencies in the long term would be in the best interests
274
of the corporation’s shareholders.
The decision has been
272. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 5 (2004).
273. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184
(Del. 1986).
274. Id. Outside of the so-called “Revlon zone,” the Delaware Supreme Court
has stated that a board may consider non-shareholder constituencies so long as
there are rationally related benefits to the shareholders in doing so. Id. at 182
(citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)); cf. In
re Toys “R” Us, Inc., S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 999 n.32 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“In
the context of a decision to sell the whole company, the directors could only
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interpreted by later Delaware court decisions to hold that the shortterm interests, not the long-term interests, of the shareholders are
all that may be considered by a board in determining whether to
275
enter into a proposed sale transaction.
The extent to which Minnesota courts would apply a standard
276
comparable to the one in Revlon is uncertain.
Although the
Minnesota courts have not focused on the Revlon standard, it is
clear that Revlon would not remain totally intact given Minnesota’s
277
multiple-constituency statute.
That statute allows a director, in
considering any action, to consider interests of non-shareholder
278
While practitioners generally advise boards of
constituencies.
Minnesota corporations that they should not approve a sale
proposal that is substantially less favorable to shareholders than
another alternative even if employees are treated much better
under the proposal, the statute presumably would allow boards to
approve a transaction that is slightly less favorable to shareholders
because it is substantially more favorable to employees, suppliers,
creditors, customers, and affected communities than the
alternatives. Moreover, the multiple-constituency statute makes it
absolutely clear that, unlike the frequent interpretation of Revlon,
both short-term and long-term interests of shareholders can be
considered when making the sale decision.
Minnesota does not have a Revlon doctrine, but Revlon has not
279
had the precedential value that some would suggest.
Indeed,
consider those constituencies if doing so is rationally related to some benefit to
the stockholders, which in that special context must have a relation to price.”).
275. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150
(Del. 1990) (stating that unless a board of directors is acting under the limited set
of circumstances defined in Revlon, it is not under any “per se duty” to maximize
short-term value for its shareholders); In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig., Nos.
Civ.A. 13656, 13699, 1994 WL 698483, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 1994), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995)
(holding that the transfer of a decision regarding a corporation sale to the
stockholder-directors was a defensive action best evaluated under Unocal, and not
a transfer of control requiring the directors to maximize short-term values as
defined in Revlon). This interpretation has been echoed by commentators. See,
e.g., Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor
Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 11 (2002) (explaining that Revlon’s decision required
that directors maximize short-term shareholder values after deciding to sell the
company for cash).
276. Vaaler, supra note 4, at 1369 n.8.
277. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251, subd. 5.
278. Id.
279. See Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 227, at 1614 (stating that an

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

61

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
09GARONSTANCHFIELDMATHESON.DOC

830

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

1/14/2006 5:57:31 PM

[Vol. 32:2

Revlon and its progeny may have created more unpredictability and
surprises than any other line of Delaware cases.
In the Time-Warner case, the Delaware Supreme Court
established that in a stock-for-stock merger, Revlon is not applicable
because the shareholders of the merged company become
280
shareholders of the surviving company.
The decision was
necessary because Revlon had been interpreted to preclude the
consideration of long-term shareholder interests, which are highly
relevant for board consideration in a stock-for-stock transaction
where shareholders of the merged corporation become equity
owners of the surviving corporation.
This naturally led to the question of which standard, Revlon or
Time-Warner, applied in part-cash, part-stock transactions, including
transactions in which each shareholder received both stock and
cash, transactions with a cash-election feature, and transactions in
which holders of one class received cash and holders of another
class received stock. Although the Delaware courts have decided at
281
least two such cases, no bright line rule has been established with
respect to the percentage of cash that subjects a corporation to the
Revlon standard. The authors submit that Delaware would have
been better off without the Revlon/non-Revlon bifurcation, so that
corporations could consider all factors, including the percentage of
stock received and its long-term value, in determining whether the
transaction was in the best interests of the corporation in the
directors’ estimation.
The artificial Revlon/Time-Warner dichotomy created another
282
surprise. The QVC case, like Time-Warner, involved a straight
stock-for-stock transaction. However, following completion of the
proposed merger, a single shareholder would have owned a
majority of the voting power in the surviving company. The court
determined that in that situation, Revlon did apply, notwithstanding
Time-Warner, because the minority shareholders of the surviving
articulate rationale to determine when a case should be subject to Revlon duties is
lacking).
280. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1142.
281. See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 (Del. 1995)
(transaction in which target company shareholders would receive 33% cash and
67% stock deemed not to trigger Revlon duties); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig.,
757 A.2d 720, 732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999) (cash consideration in excess of 60%
presumed to trigger Revlon duties).
282. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
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company would not in the future have the opportunity to receive a
283
The “controlling shareholder” exception to
control premium.
the Time-Warner exception to the Revlon standard could not have
been predicted based on the reasoning of the Delaware Supreme
284
Court in Time-Warner.
It is uncertain whether Revlon applies if a
single shareholder owns practical voting control of the survivor
even though that control is not a majority of the voting power of
the corporation.
The ad hoc creation of Delaware law through court decisions,
as evidenced by Revlon and its progeny, has not created the
precedential value that law-abiding boards need in order to
conduct themselves in accordance with the law when considering
proposed sales of their corporations.
d. Phelps Dodge, ACE Ltd., IXC Communications—
Same Time, Same Issues, Different Results
The Revlon line of cases, particularly after Time-Warner and
QVC, appeared to establish that the board of directors of a
Delaware corporation could approve a stock-for-stock merger in
which no shareholder would control the merged corporation
without being required to get the best price it could reasonably
obtain from a sale of the company. Nine years after the TimeWarner decision, however, many practitioners were surprised to
learn that deal-protection provisions in stock-for-stock merger
agreements had to be limited even though the Revlon standard did
not apply.
285
In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. and ACE Ltd.
286
v. Capital Re Corp., the Delaware Court of Chancery concluded
that even in stock-for-stock mergers, boards cannot exercise their
business judgment to agree in the merger agreement to refuse to
287
discuss or consider alternative proposals. That appeared to signal
that deal protections could not be materially more restrictive in
283. Id. at 48.
284. The Delaware Chancery Court in Time-Warner had used “control”
reasoning similar to that adopted by the Supreme Court in QVC, however.
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Nos. Civ.A. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989
WL 79880, at *21-23 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
285. Nos. Civ.A. 17398, 17383, 17427, 1999 WL 1054255 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27,
1999).
286. 747 A.2d 95 (Del. Ch. 1999).
287. Phelps Dodge, 1999 WL 1054255, at *1-2; ACE Ltd., 747 A.2d at 108-09.
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Time-Warner stock-for-stock transactions than in Revlon cash
transactions. Two days after the ACE Ltd. decision, however, the
Court of Chancery in In re IXC Communications, Inc. Shareholders
288
Litigation v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc., appeared to take a contrary
position concerning restrictions on deal protections in non-Revlon
situations, perhaps because no third-party proposal had in fact
been made in that case.
As these nearly simultaneous, yet seemingly contradictory,
holdings indicate, having a substantial body of case law to refer to
in the Revlon context provides very limited guidance to Delaware
289
corporations, directors, and practitioners.
e.

Singer v. Magnavox/Weinberger v. UOP—Flip Flop

For the most part, the Delaware courts will attempt to
distinguish cases from prior precedent based on what the court
believes are meaningful factual differences (Revlon, Time-Warner,
QVC) or will adopt apparently inconsistent positions (Phelps Dodge,
ACE Ltd., IXC Communications) without acknowledging the
inconsistencies. However, the Delaware courts will occasionally
reverse themselves to the surprise of practitioners and corporations
alike.
For example, the Delaware courts reversed themselves on the
basic issue of whether a business purpose is necessary for a merger.
290
In Singer v. Magnavox, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a
parent corporation, despite having majority voting power with
respect to the shares of its subsidiary, could not merge with the
majority-owned subsidiary, thereby freezing-out minority
shareholders without their consent, without a proper business

288. Nos. C.A. 17324, 17334, 1999 WL 1009174 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999).
289. One intriguing theory is that a review of the decision-making process
employed by the target company’s board of directors was a better predictor of the
board’s success in litigation in Delaware than any reference to admittedly
ambiguous standards of review created by the Delaware courts. See Gregory V.
Varallo & Srinivas M. Raju, A Process Based Model for Analyzing Deal Protection
Measures, 55 BUS. LAW. 1609, 1635-36 (2000).
290. 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977) (“We hold the law to be that a Delaware
Court will not be indifferent to the purpose of a merger when a freeze-out of
minority stockholders on a cash-out basis is alleged to be its sole purpose. In such
a situation, if it is alleged that the purpose is improper because of the fiduciary
obligation owed to the minority, the Court is duty bound to closely examine that
allegation even when all of the relevant statutory formalities have been satisfied.”).
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purpose.
Six years later, in Weinberger v. UOP, the Delaware
Supreme Court unpredictably reversed its position on Singer and
concluded that no business purpose was required.
2.

Sale of Substantially All Assets

In deciding cases without judicial precedents, Delaware courts,
at times, take positions contrary to the positions predicted by
leading Delaware practitioners.
These deviations from
practitioners’ expectations underscore the fact that even with a
robust body of case law, Delaware courts have not established
precedent on key issues that have been codified by the Minnesota
statute. A case in point is the 2004 Delaware decision in Hollinger
293
Inc. v. Hollinger International, Inc.
Hollinger involved the issue of whether the sale of substantially
all of the assets of a subsidiary of a Delaware corporation
constitutes the sale of substantially all of the assets of the parent
corporation requiring a vote of the shareholders of the parent
294
under section 271 of the Delaware statute.
The whole area of
what constitutes a sale of substantially all assets of a Delaware
corporation is confusing despite a number of cases in the area, and
the issue of whether a sale of assets by a subsidiary is the same as a
sale of assets by the parent surprisingly was one of first impression
295
in Delaware.
The court denied the preliminary injunction motion of the
controlling shareholder of the parent, who claimed that
shareholder approval at the parent level was required. The court
denied the motion on the basis that regardless of whether the court
291. The MBCA, as adopted, in reaction to this decision and a Minnesota
court decision to the same effect that followed it, Bird v. Wirtz, 266 N.W.2d 166
(Minn. 1978), included a provision expressly allowing corporations to merge with
or without a business purpose pursuant to a plan of merger approved by the board
and a majority vote of the voting power of the outstanding shares. See MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.601, subd. 1 (West 2004) (Reporter’s Notes, 1981) (explaining the
rationale for the elimination of the business purpose requirement from the
MBCA); see also supra Part IV.A.5.
292. 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983).
293. 858 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 2004).
294. The defendants in the Hollinger case argued that section 271 of the
Delaware statute does not contemplate ignoring the separate existence of
subsidiaries unless the corporate veil between the parent and subsidiary may be
pierced. Id. at 373.
295. Id. at 348.
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treated the assets of the subsidiary as assets of the parent
corporation, the sale did not constitute a sale of substantially all
296
assets of the parent corporation.
However, in dicta, the court
indicated that it might ignore the technical argument that a sale of
assets by a subsidiary was not a sale by the parent at all for purposes
of section 271, which, according to one leading Delaware law firm,
was “[c]ontrary to the prevailing view among practitioners that
section 271 does not trigger a stockholder vote at the parent level
297
when a subsidiary sells all or substantially all of its assets.”
The
court stated:
When an asset sale by the wholly owned subsidiary is to be
consummated by a contract in which the parent entity
guarantees the performance of the selling subsidiary that
is disposing of all of its assets and in which the parent is
liable for any breach of warranty by the subsidiary, the
direct act of the parent’s board can, without any
appreciable stretch, be viewed as selling assets of the
298
parent itself.
This statement by the court likely sent shock waves through the
Delaware bar, some members of which had been advising
corporations for years that sales of assets by a subsidiary should not
be ascribed to the parent under any circumstances under section
299
Likely reacting to the inconsistency between the court’s
271.
statement and the practitioners’ advice, the Delaware legislature
finally brought some—but not complete—clarity to the asset-sale
area. Effective August 1, 2005, the Delaware corporate statute was
amended to provide that shareholders of a corporation need not
approve a transfer of the corporation’s assets to a wholly owned
300
and controlled subsidiary.
296. Id. at 348-49.
297. Richards, Layton & Finger, P.A., Recent Delaware Corporate Law Decisions
(Oct. 2004), http://www.rlf.com/articles/10_2004_Corp_Mailing-010530.pdf (last
visited Jan. 4, 2006).
298. Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 375.
299. While the court did not decide the issue, its discussion suggested that if
forced to decide it in the future, it would collapse the subsidiary and the parent
for purposes of the section 271 test. One example it gave was of a holding
company under which all assets were held by subsidiaries. It noted that under the
defendants’ theory, if the subsidiaries’ assets were all sold and guaranties were
provided by the parent, no consent of the parent’s shareholders would be
needed⎯a result that the court did not appear ready to accept. See id. at 374.
300. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271(c) (2001 & Supp. 2005) (amended by 75 Del.
Laws ch. 30 (2005)).
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Because a transfer of substantially all of a corporation’s assets
to a wholly owned subsidiary and then a retransfer by the subsidiary
of those assets would arguably avoid a shareholder vote entirely if
sales of assets by a subsidiary were not deemed to be sales by the
parent, there is a concern that an exemption for transfers to a
wholly owned subsidiary of the nature enacted in Minnesota and
Delaware not be used as a device to avoid a shareholder vote
through a multi-step transaction. The 2005 amendment to the
Delaware statute addresses this concern by providing that the
property and assets of a corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiaries must be considered on a consolidated basis in
determining whether a transfer of substantially all assets has
occurred—consistent with the dicta of the Hollinger court and
contrary to the previous position of leading Delaware
301
practitioners.
The Minnesota statute itself is silent regarding
whether assets of a corporation and its subsidiaries would be
consolidated—although the Minnesota bar referenced the issue in
its recommendation to the legislature, and a court would
presumably consolidate in appropriate circumstances. As the
authors have previously noted regarding the Minnesota statute:
Read literally, Section 302A.661 permits a subsidiary to
dispose of what constitutes substantially all of the parent’s
assets on a consolidated basis without a vote of the
parent’s shareholders. Such assets do not constitute assets
of the parent unless the separate corporate entities are
disregarded. A court, however, might make a less literal
and more equitable determination to require a vote of the
parent’s shareholders even if the assets being transferred
are owned by the subsidiary, particularly if the assets had
previously been transferred by the parent corporation to
302
the subsidiary without a shareholder vote.
Until the Delaware legislature brought some clarity to this area
in 2005, those Delaware practitioners that had advised clients that a
sale of subsidiary assets probably did not necessitate a vote of the
parent’s shareholders regardless of the magnitude of the sale had,
as a corollary to that advice, further advised clients that a transfer of
assets to subsidiaries might require a shareholder vote. That latter
301. Id. (“For purposes of [section 271] only, the property and assets of the
corporation include the property and assets of any [wholly owned and controlled]
subsidiary of the corporation.”).
302. 18 MATHESON & GARON, supra note 10, § 7.19, at 280-81.
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advice impeded corporate restructuring by Delaware corporations
prior to the 2005 amendment to the Delaware statute, whereas
Minnesota corporations have formed subsidiaries and transferred
substantial assets to them for years without a shareholder vote and
without any fear of violating the MBCA.
Although the Delaware legislature brought some certainty to
the parent-subsidiary issues in the asset-sale context, it, unlike the
303
Minnesota legislature, has done nothing to address a more basic
but far more confusing area: deciding what constitutes
“substantially all” of a corporation’s assets for purposes of section
271. In that area, Hollinger represents a significant shift from prior
court decisions, but still does not provide the kind of guidance that
corporations and their advisers need.
In previous court decisions, including the seminal case of
304
Gimbel v. Signal Co., the Delaware courts had applied a very
imprecise quantitative/qualitative test to determine what
constituted substantially all of the assets. Despite the apparent
plain meaning of the words “substantially all,” certain Delaware
courts appeared to be looking quantitatively at whether the assets
sold constituted a majority of the assets or net worth of the
corporation or produced a majority of the corporation’s revenues
305
or income. Conservative practitioners were concerned that a sale
of a majority of a corporation’s assets would be deemed to
constitute a sale of substantially all assets and thereby necessitate a
shareholder vote. The Delaware courts noted, however, that the
“test does not lend itself to a strict mathematical standard to be
306
applied in every case . . . .”
The qualitative nature of the test
utilized by Gimbel and several other decisions appeared to be based
on whether the assets sold were the assets that had been the
303. Because of the continuing uncertainty of what constituted “substantially
all assets” under the MBCA provision, the Minnesota corporate bar
recommended, and the legislature in 2004 enacted, the 25% safe harbor discussed
below that the court in Hollinger, while citing in support of its position, could not
ensure is the governing law of Delaware.
304. 316 A.2d 599, 606 (Del. Ch. 1974) (“If the sale is of assets quantitatively
vital to the operation of the corporation and is out of the ordinary and
substantially affects the existence and purpose of the corporation, then it is
beyond the power of the Board of Directors.”).
305. See, e.g., Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274, 1276 (Del. Ch. 1981) (granting
shareholder motion for preliminary injunction preventing the sale of assets by the
company that constituted 51% of the corporation’s total assets).
306. Gimbel, 316 A.2d at 605.
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foundation of the business of the corporation (rather than more
recently acquired businesses) and substantially affected the
307
existence and purpose of the corporation.
The qualitative test
obviously introduced significant subjectivity and uncertainty into
the equation, which was already imprecise under the quantitative
test.
In Hollinger, the court found that the business being sold
constituted more than 55% of the total consolidated asset value of
the corporation’s two main businesses on a market-value basis and
more than 35% of consolidated assets on a book-value basis and
constituted less than 50% of the consolidated revenues and
approximately 50% of the consolidated earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA—which is
effectively a cash flow standard) of the corporation’s two main
308
businesses.
However, the court, contrary to certain previous
decisions, refused to accept an “approximately half” standard on
309
grounds that the legislature never intended such a standard.
Interestingly, in that connection the court cited with approval the
310
Model Business Corporation Act’s 25% retention standard
(which is virtually identical to, and the model for, the provision
311
added to the MBCA in 2004) as support for its position.
The
court also questioned the wisdom of a qualitative test, suggesting
that if the assets are not quantitatively vital, they cannot
312
substantially affect the existence and purpose of the corporation.
307. See, e.g., Katz, 431 A.2d at 1276 (“[T]he proposal . . . to embark on the
manufacture of plastic drums represents a radical departure from [the company’s]
historically successful line of business, namely steel drums.”).
308. Hollinger Inc. v. Hollinger Int’l., Inc., 858 A.2d 321, 380 (Del. Ch. 2004).
309. Id. at 386.
310. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 12.02 (2005). Under the Model Act’s standard, a
sale or other disposition of assets requires shareholder approval if, absent certain
exceptions, the transaction would leave the corporation without a “significant
continuing business activity.” Id. § 12.02(a). A corporation will be conclusively
deemed to have retained a significant continuing business activity if it retains a
business that represented at least 25% of the corporation’s consolidated (1) total
assets as of the most recently completed fiscal year and (2) income from
continuing operations before taxes or revenues from continuing operations for
that year. Id.
311. Hollinger, 858 A.2d at 386 n.79.
312. The court was quite straight-forward in admitting the lack of clarity on
this subject in previous Delaware cases, noting: “It would be less than candid to
fail to acknowledge that the § 271 case law provides less than ideal certainty about
the application of the statute to particular circumstances.” Id. at 378. “Although
by no means wholly consistent, that [Delaware] case law has, by and large, refused
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The Hollinger analysis is certainly better than the prior case law, but
it still lacks the certainty of the statutory provisions in the MBCA.
3.

Omnicare

While the problems in the area of sales of substantially all
assets appear to be with inconsistent and unexpected
interpretations of a vague statutory provision, the Delaware courts
also have surprised practitioners by interpreting fairly precise
statutory provisions in a manner contrary to what the language of,
and policy behind, the statutory provisions suggest. The 2003
decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS
313
Healthcare, Inc. is the chief offender in this regard.
Omnicare involved the validity of a voting agreement in which
holders of a majority of the voting stock agreed in advance to vote
to approve a merger. Genesis and Omnicare were competing to
purchase NCS, an insolvent publicly traded Delaware
314
Genesis won the battle and, as part of the Genesis
corporation.
merger agreement, two NCS shareholders who held the majority of
the voting power of NCS’s stock agreed to vote in favor of the
315
Genesis merger.
The merger agreement required that the
merger be submitted to a shareholder vote, and that the two NCS
shareholders who were parties to the voting agreement agree to
vote in favor of the merger agreement, even if the board of
316
directors withdrew its recommendation of the merger.
Everything in the Delaware statute suggested that the court
would uphold the validity of the voting agreement and refuse to
enjoin the shareholders meeting to vote on the merger. First, a
written agreement between two or more shareholders of a
Delaware corporation may provide that the shares held by them will
317
be voted as provided in the agreement.
Second, the Delaware
statute was amended years before to clarify that a merger
to find that a disposition involved substantially all of the assets of a corporation
when the assets that would remain after the sale were, in themselves, substantial
and profitable.” Id. at 385.
313. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
314. Id. at 917-18.
315. Id. at 918.
316. Id.
317. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218(c) (2001). The Delaware Supreme Court had
taken this position even before the statute was enacted. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum
& Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 53A.2d 441 (Del. 1947).
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agreement may provide that it must be submitted to shareholders
for approval even if a board of directors later determines that the
merger is no longer advisable and recommends that the
318
shareholders reject the merger agreement.
Third, the Delaware
statute allows shareholders to take action by less than unanimous
written consent unless otherwise provided in a corporation’s
319
certificate of incorporation.
Because the Delaware legislature
determined that a corporation’s shareholders can act by less than
unanimous written consent without having a meeting at all, the
presumption was that holders of a majority of the voting power of
the corporation’s outstanding stock could agree in writing in
advance of a shareholders’ meeting to take binding action at that
meeting.
Contrary to expectations, in a sharply divided three-to-two
decision, the Delaware Supreme Court enjoined the meeting of
shareholders called to approve the merger agreement. The
majority’s reasoning was that a corporation could not require a
shareholders meeting to be held to approve a merger agreement
despite a board’s withdrawal of its approval of the merger if the
majority shareholder vote in favor of the merger agreement was
320
predetermined by a binding voting agreement.
This decision
leaves practitioners guessing about whether the Omnicare decision is
likely to be reversed in the future, particularly in view of the split
321
nature of the decision and the adverse reaction to it, and leaves a
318. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 146 (2001 & Supp. 2004) (formerly applicable to
merger agreements only and codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2001)).
319. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228.
320. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 935-36.
321. See, e.g., Orman v. Cullman, No. Civ.A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395, at *8
n.98 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004). Chancellor Chandler’s comments about the
practical effects of Omnicare’s post-hoc analysis, “how can a board know, at the time
of adopting defensive devices, the terms of a transaction that emerges at a later
time? As formulated, the test would appear to result in judicial invalidation of
negotiated contractual provisions based on the advantages of hindsight.” Id. Vice
Chancellor Strine has attacked the bright-line approach taken by the
Omnicare majority. Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful, Presumably There
Are Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to
the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877 (2005). After acknowledging
the famous statement in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439
(Del. 1971), “that inequitable action does not become permissible simply because
it is legally possible,” he noted that the corollary to that statement is that if the
legislature has permitted certain actions, there must be some circumstances in
which those actions are permissible—otherwise, why permit them at all? Id. at 883.
When a court adopts a bright-line equity overlay on legislatively permitted actions,

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2006

71

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 6
09GARONSTANCHFIELDMATHESON.DOC

840

1/14/2006 5:57:31 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:2

lingering issue about whether a voting percentage lockup short of a
majority (e.g., 45%, 40%, or 35%) would also be invalidated on the
theory that it constituted practical control of the corporation.
V. CONCLUSION
The MBCA is a state-of-the-art corporate statute. It and similar
statutes of many other states provide substantially more flexibility
and certainty than the Delaware statute to corporations and
practitioners at substantially less cost. Nevertheless, there are a few
provisions in the MBCA, most notably section 302A.751 authorizing
courts to grant equitable remedies to shareholders, that, with
respect to closely held, multiple-shareholder corporations, may be
sufficiently detrimental to justify incorporation in Delaware despite
the greater cost and the lack of flexibility and certainty of the
Delaware statute. The argument, however, that the extensive case
law in Delaware increases predictability regarding Delaware
corporate law as compared to the substantially more-extensive
codification of the laws of Minnesota and several other states simply
does not survive scrutiny. In many core aspects of corporate law,
Delaware case law does not provide the clarity or consistency
necessary to overcome the imprecision and incompleteness of the
Delaware statute and fails to provide precedential predictability.

Strine argues, the court wrongly intrudes into the province of the legislature. Id.
at 903-05. A similar concern has been expressed by former Chief Justice Veasey.
Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 224, at 1461 n.256 (“Equitable principles
should intrude on lawful activity only when there is a breach of fiduciary duty.”).
The authors believe that the problem Strine and Veasey identify is not exclusive to
the Omnicare decision, but rather it is a function of the expansive role generally
undertaken by the Delaware courts. Indeed, the problems caused by this kind of
equity overlay on express legislative authorization can be found in a number of
areas of Delaware corporate law. See, e.g., supra Part IV.B.1.e. (discussing the
“judicial legislation” that created the “business purpose” test for mergers that was
ultimately “repealed” by the courts).
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